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  The regime of a free society needs room for vast 
experimentation. Crises, emergencies, experience at the individual 
and community levels produce new insights; problems emerge in 
new dimensions; needs, once never imagined, appear. To stop 
experimentation and the testing of new decrees and controls is to 
deprive society of a needed versatility.1 
  – Justice William Douglas 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born 
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by 
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.2 
  – Justice Louis Brandeis 
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 1. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled 
on other grounds by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967).  
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ABSTRACT 
  Emerging environmental problems and technologies, coupled with 
the existence of mature regulatory regimes governing most industrial 
sources of pollution, reveal with new clarity the harms that individual 
behaviors can inflict on the environment. Changing how individuals 
impact the environment through their daily behaviors, however, 
requires a reorientation of environmental law and policy and a 
balancing of government prerogatives with individual liberty. A 
growing body of legal scholarship recognizes the environmental 
significance of individual behaviors, critiques the failure of law and 
policy to capture harms traceable to individuals, and suggests and 
evaluates strategies for capturing individual harms going forward. In 
this discussion, mandates on individuals have been largely dismissed 
as a policy tool for changing environmentally significant individual 
behaviors because of a widely shared view (1) that detection and 
enforcement of such mandates would pose insurmountable technical, 
administrative, and cost barriers and (2) that the application of 
mandates to individuals would trigger insurmountable objections to 
their intrusive effect, essentially so offending notions of liberty and 
privacy that they could not be adopted or enforced. 
  But there are reasons to believe that the cost and feasibility of 
imposing mandates on environmentally significant individual 
behaviors may be less daunting than widely imagined. Notably, 
intrusion objections have yet to be subjected to critical examination. A 
better understanding of whether, when, and why mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors might trigger fatal 
intrusion objections would help to assess mandates as a policy tool for 
changing environmentally significant individual behaviors and would 
offer guidance about how mandates could be structured to avoid such 
objections. 
  This Article undertakes an initial effort to better define and 
understand the intrusion objection as it applies to the use of individual 
mandates to change environmentally significant behaviors. Part I 
surveys prior and existing laws aimed at individual behaviors and 
associated environmental harms to develop a rough sense of when 
such regulations have, and have not, triggered what could be 
characterized as intrusion objections. Part II then looks to substantive 
due process jurisprudence for further guidance about when and why 
government restrictions on individual freedom might give rise to 
intrusion objections. Part III builds on Parts I and II to offer a more 
nuanced understanding of the intrusion objection and suggests some 
principles to guide the consideration and development of mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors going forward. Part 
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III proposes as an example an energy-waste ordinance designed to 
avoid intrusion objections. 
  The Article concludes that the obstacle to direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors posed by the 
intrusion objection is both narrower and broader than presently 
recognized. The obstacle posed by the intrusion objection is narrower 
because although the enforcement of mandates against some 
primarily in-home behaviors may occasion insurmountable privacy 
objections, other environmentally significant individual behaviors can 
be and are regulated without triggering these objections. The obstacle 
posed by the intrusion objection is broader because perceived 
government intrusion is just one of the costs—along with monetary 
costs and inconvenience—that regulation can impose on individuals. 
The more salient variable for purposes of understanding the 
objections to regulating environmentally significant individual 
behaviors is transparency: direct regulation, as opposed to indirect 
regulation, tends to make all of the costs of regulation more 
transparent, an effect that may invite public resistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emerging environmental problems and technologies, coupled 
with the maturation of regulatory regimes governing most industrial 
sources of pollution, reveal with new clarity the harms that individual 
behaviors and lifestyles inflict on the environment. Individual 
behaviors and lifestyles lie at the core of both the climate-change 
problem and its potential solutions.3 Individuals directly pollute a 
range of environmental media in significant volumes; indeed, 
individual sources are responsible for approximately “a third of the 
chemicals that form low-level ozone or smog,” and “[h]ouseholds 
discharge as much mercury to wastewater as do all large industrial 
facilities combined.”4 Increasingly sophisticated detection and 
mapping methods document resource depletion and the 
unsustainability of present Western lifestyles and consumption.5 In 
the memorable words of one scholar, “Actions that may not have 
previously appeared to be worthy of regulation have been found to 
cause significant adverse impacts cumulatively, over time, and in 
context—heading us toward a certain death by a thousand cuts.”6 But 
 
 3. Including only “behaviors over which individuals have direct, substantial control”—and 
thereby excluding emissions associated with the production of consumer goods and food—the 
average American emitted over seven tons of carbon dioxide in 2000, for a total of 4.1 trillion 
pounds of individual emissions—compared to the 3.9 trillion pounds attributable to the entire 
industrial sector. Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral 
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1693–94 (2007). Individual emissions constitute 32 percent 
of annual emissions in the United States. Id. at 1694. For an excellent, in-depth explanation of 
the environmental impact of individual behaviors on climate change, see generally JASON J. 
CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 
(2011). 
 4. Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: 
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 120–21 (2009). 
 5. For example, satellite mapping and other technologies are used to more accurately 
assess deforestation and forest degradation. See, e.g., Scott J Goetz, Alessandro Baccini, Nadine 
T Laporte, Tracy Johns, Wayne Walker, Josef Kellndorfer, Richard A Houghton & Mindy Sun, 
Mapping and Monitoring Carbon Stocks with Satellite Observations: A Comparison of Methods, 
CARBON BALANCE & MGMT., Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.cbmjournal.com/content/4/1/2 
(reviewing various remote-sensing techniques for measuring aboveground biomass and 
concluding that those techniques provide advantages over traditional technologies). Some 
journals, such as Remote Sensing of Environment, focus solely on advanced methods of 
environmental monitoring. See Remote Sensing of Environment, ELSEVIER, http://www.journals.
elsevier.com/remote-sensing-of-environment (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (“The emphasis of the 
journal is on biophysical and quantitative approaches to remote sensing at local to global 
scales.”). 
 6. Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green Building Laws 
and the Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 ENVTL. L. 507, 562 (2009) (footnote 
omitted). 
KUH IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  3:58 PM 
2012] WHEN GOVERNMENT INTRUDES 1115 
existing federal environmental laws focus on controlling the impacts 
of resource extraction—pollution generated by industrial sources 
during, for example, the manufacturing or production of a good—and 
the disposal of waste. These laws rarely address individual behaviors 
or apply directly to private individuals.7 And, in the few instances in 
which federal environmental laws do directly impose controls on 
individuals—for example, by introducing limits on the use of private 
property to protect wetlands or endangered species8—enforcement 
has often been both controversial and halting.9 Using law to change 
how individuals impact the environment through their behaviors and 
lifestyles thus requires a reorientation of environmental law and 
policy and also perhaps a balancing of government prerogatives with 
individual liberty. 
Four “types of constraint[s]” operate on individual behaviors and 
thus offer potential paths for reorienting environmental law and 
policy to better capture or control harms from individual behaviors: a 
law, or mandate, that directs behaviors by threatening sanctions; 
social norms; markets; and architecture, or features of the world.10 
Mandates impose direct constraints on behaviors, whereas social 
norms, markets, and architecture impose indirect constraints on 
behaviors. As Professor Lawrence Lessig explains, “In its direct 
 
 7. Individuals are, for example, specifically exempted from regulation under subtitle C of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(2006), which allows individuals to dispose of hazardous wastes, without any controls, as part of 
the nonhazardous-solid-waste stream. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1) (2011) (setting forth the 
household-waste exemption to RCRA, an exemption that provides that “household waste,” or 
“any material . . . derived from households” is not deemed hazardous waste under the law, 
regardless of whether it exhibits hazard characteristics or contains listed hazardous wastes); see 
also John C. Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior To Address Climate Change: Options 
for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 121 (2008) (“[F]ederal environmental laws are directed 
primarily at large emitters and make relatively infrequent efforts to direct individual 
behavior.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated 
Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 523–29 (2004) (reviewing 
traditional regulation of industrial sources and illustrating how that regulation frequently fails to 
capture environmental harms that arise from individual behaviors). 
 8. See Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) 
(2006) (prohibiting the “taking” of endangered species); Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a) (2006) (requiring permits for the dredging or filling of navigable waters); see also infra 
notes 109–16 and accompanying text. 
 9. For a discussion of the difficulties that accompany implementing controls on individuals 
through the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s) inspection and maintenance (I/M) program, through 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), and through section 9 of the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973 (ESA), see infra notes 79–97, 108–20, 129–41 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–63 (1998) 
(listing these four “types of constraint[s]”).  
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aspect, the law uses its traditional means to direct an object of 
regulation (whether the individual regulated, norms, the market, or 
architecture); in its indirect aspect, it regulates these other regulators 
so that they regulate the individual differently.”11 One can see these 
different constraints in operation in the field of air pollution. A 
public-information campaign designed to encourage people to cease 
backyard burning is a regulation of norms designed to influence, and 
thereby to regulate indirectly, individual behaviors. A subsidy for 
hybrid vehicles is a regulation of the market that indirectly regulates 
the harms imposed by individual driving behavior. Smart-growth 
zoning, designed to reduce car travel, is a direct regulation of 
architecture that indirectly regulates individual driving behavior. By 
contrast, an environmental speed limit designed to reduce air 
pollution by reducing driving speeds is a direct regulation of 
individual behaviors. 
A growing body of legal scholarship recognizes the 
environmental significance of individual behaviors and lifestyles, 
critiques the failure of environmental law and policy to speak directly 
to individuals as sources of environmental harm, and suggests and 
evaluates strategies for capturing individual harms going forward.12 
 
 11. Id. at 666. 
 12. See, e.g., CZARNEZKI, supra note 3 (detailing the environmental impacts of everyday 
behaviors, reviewing existing attempts to change those behaviors, and suggesting policy 
approaches for the future); Babcock, supra note 4 (observing that individuals are an important 
source of environmental problems, examining “why changing [norms] is a critical part of any 
campaign to make individuals more environmentally responsible,” and identifying “various 
norm- and behavior-changing tools”); Dernbach, supra note 7 (proposing ways for 
congressional climate legislation to better engage individuals); Andrew Green, Creating 
Environmentalists: Environmental Law, Identity and Commitment, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 1 
(2006) (considering the policy ramifications of theories of individual identity, choice, and 
commitment development); Andrew Green, Norms, Institutions, and the Environment, 57 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 105 (2007) (assessing the potential for government to influence environmental 
values and norms); Andrew Green, Self Control, Individual Choice, and Climate Change, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 77, 81 (2008) (assuming that individuals “have values or norms that favor 
environmental action” but questioning their capacity to make choices consistent with such 
values and norms); Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental 
Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2006) (arguing that subsidies may 
undermine environmental values); Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 155 (2011) (analyzing “the problem of individual harms through the lens of 
environmental federalism” and “evaluat[ing] the potential role of local information, local 
governments, and local implementation in designing policy to capture individual environmental 
harms”); Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and 
Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,825 (2008) (noting the connection between consumption 
and climate change, describing the historical lack of attention to consumption in environmental 
policy, discussing the relationship between law and consumer preferences, and explaining why 
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This scholarship cautions against relying solely on price signals,13 
product mandates,14 or other common methods of indirectly changing 
environmentally significant individual behaviors15 or reducing the 
 
consumption must now be addressed head-on by environmental policy); Albert C. Lin, 
Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135 (2009) (emphasizing the role of 
values in behavioral choices and evaluating strategies for changing behaviors within the 
American evangelical community); James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 
ENVTL. L. 1243 (1997) (examining “the historic, economic, and policy issues linking sustainable 
consumption and environmental law” and “build[ing] an analytical framework to assess and 
identify meaningful future roles for the law to play in moving toward the goal of sustainable 
consumption”); Vandenbergh, supra note 7 (quantifying individuals’ contributions to 
environmental degradation, identifying limitations of traditional command-and-control and 
economic-incentive-based regulation of individual behavior, and suggesting how “individual 
environmentally significant behavior can be changed through a mix of traditional and new 
approaches”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm 
Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005) (advocating personal 
norm management to address “individual behavior in negative-payoff, loose-knit group 
situations”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon 
Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008) [hereinafter Vandenbergh et 
al., Individual Carbon Emissions] (identifying individual greenhouse-gas-emitting behaviors that 
are the most susceptible to change and suggesting strategies for changing them); Vandenbergh 
& Steinemann, supra note 3 (demonstrating “that reducing individuals’ greenhouse gas 
emissions in the United States can make a meaningful contribution to the global effort to reduce 
the risk of catastrophic climate change” and “argu[ing] that the law has a central role to play in 
reducing emissions attributable to individuals by activating the emerging norm of carbon 
neutrality” and integrating it with “traditional regulatory measures”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
Paul C. Stern, Gerald T. Gardner, Thomas Dietz & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Implementing the 
Behavioral Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,547, 10,551–52 (2010) (making recommendations to policymakers about how 
best to achieve reductions in harms from environmentally significant individual behaviors); Jed 
S. Ela, Comment, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence To 
Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93 (2009) (arguing for a national 
norm campaign to reduce individual greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions that would target highly 
visible behaviors). 
 13. See Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions, supra note 12, at 1704 
(describing studies suggesting that price signals may have only a limited effect on behavior); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the 
Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 765 (2011) (criticizing current GHG-control strategies 
aimed at the household sector for “reflect[ing] strong assumptions about the influence of price 
and thus often overlook[ing] other influences on behavior”).  
 14. See ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & KYLE W. DANISH, PEW CTR. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
DESIGNING A MANDATORY GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR THE U.S. 45 
(2003) (describing limitations on the effectiveness of product-efficiency mandates, including the 
rebound and junker effects). 
 15. This term encompasses behaviors of individuals that, taken alone, have a negligible 
impact on the environment but that, in the aggregate, may significantly harm the environment. 
See Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 518 (“We are polluters. Each of us. We pollute when we 
drive our cars, fertilize and mow our yards, pour household chemicals on the ground or down 
the drain, and engage in myriad other common activities. Although each activity contributes 
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harms occasioned by such behaviors.16 The scholarship instead 
advocates use of a variety of policy tools, most importantly 
informational and norm campaigns.17 Notably, although mandates are 
the most commonly used policy tool for controlling environmental 
harms,18 and although they are recognized as having the potential to 
enhance norm campaigns aimed at environmentally significant 
individual behaviors,19 mandates on individual behaviors have 
received comparatively little attention as a policy tool for changing 
 
minute amounts of pollutants, when aggregated across millions of individuals, the total amounts 
are stunning.”). 
 16. See Thomas Dietz, Gerald T. Gardner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stern & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge To Rapidly Reduce US 
Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18,452, 18,453 (2009) (concluding that research 
suggests that a single policy tool will be insufficient to change individual and household 
behavior and that “interventions that combine appeals, information, financial incentives, 
informal social influences, and efforts to reduce the transaction costs of taking the desired 
actions” will be most effective). 
 17. See, e.g., CZARNEZKI, supra note 3, at 3–4 (identifying six decisionmaking tools that are 
useful for influencing the environmental effects of individual behavior, three of which involve 
informational or norm approaches, and predicting that “[i]n the future, the cutting edge of 
environmental law will focus on public awareness, informational mechanisms, economic and 
market incentives, and empirical inquiry into the appropriate target audience and product, the 
correct government level for action, and how to best influence social norms and support 
community initiatives”); Dernbach, supra note 7, at 123–24, 132, 144 (emphasizing that the 
“literature indicates that a variety of interventions directed at the same result are more likely to 
be effective than fewer interventions” and highlighting the role of information); Vandenbergh 
& Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1724 (explaining the need to use both norm activation and 
traditional regulatory measures, “includ[ing] taxes or subsidies, cap-and-trade schemes, 
standards that regulate the efficiency of consumer products made by industrial firms, and 
support for new technologies and infrastructure”); Ela, supra note 12, at 116–17 (“[W]hile there 
is no doubt that convenience, economic incentives, and personal norms can outweigh social 
influences in many cases, this does not mean that social influences have no effects in large-scale 
environmental collective action problems. Such a conclusion is not only a mistake, but a mistake 
with consequences, if it leads policymakers to pass up easily available opportunities to improve 
behavior change through attention to social influences.”); see also Vandenbergh et al., supra 
note 13, at 735–39 (criticizing rational-choice theory for causing energy-efficiency policies and 
programs to focus on price mechanisms and technological solutions, while neglecting “policies 
designed to encourage curtailment behavior, such as reducing motor vehicle idling, lowering 
highway driving speeds, or setting back thermostats”). 
 18. Command-and-control mandates on industrial point sources of pollution—for example, 
setting a maximum volume of pollutant that may be emitted or requiring the installation of 
pollution-control technology—compose the traditional core of environmental law and policy. 
Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 526–33. 
 19. See Kuh, supra note 12, at 193–95 (explaining how mandates might enhance norm 
campaigns); Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 600 (concluding that the expressive effects of 
command-and-control measures can enhance efforts to change individual behavior). 
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environmentally significant individual behaviors.20 This Article 
examines one of the chief rationales offered in the literature for why 
mandates have limited utility as a method of regulating individual 
behaviors: the intrusion objection. The intrusion objection posits 
generally that mandates on individual behaviors are politically 
 
 20. In his seminal article explaining the imperative to regulate, as well as the challenges to 
regulating individual behavior, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in 
the New Era of Environmental Law, supra note 7, Professor Michael Vandenbergh details the 
difficulties of trying to apply traditional command-and-control regulation to individuals, see id. 
at 554–56, 597–600. As damning as its critique of the use of mandates is, Professor 
Vanderbergh’s article nonetheless recognizes the possibility of a limited role for mandates:  
  To date, the experience with pure command and control approaches suggests that, 
at least as a first order measure, such approaches are not a viable option on their own 
for changing individual environmentally significant behavior. They may be more 
effective when combined with other regulatory instruments, or when used as a second 
order measure after information and other regulatory instruments have had an 
influence on heliefs [sic] and norms. In addition, the expressive effects of command 
and control measures may play an important role in the regulation of individual 
behavior.  
Id. at 599–600; see also Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions, supra note 12, at 1705, 
1727, 1730 (outlining strategies for changing particular environmentally significant individual 
behaviors not only by stressing informational regulation and economic incentives but also by 
incorporating “modest legal requirements” for individuals, such as the enforcement of fines for 
excessive idling). But the identified difficulties regarding the application of mandates to 
individuals resonate in the academic literature, which has largely focused on other strategies—
primarily informational and norm management—for influencing individual behavior. See, e.g., 
Babcock, supra note 4, at 123–24 (pointing out problems with command-and-control regulation 
of individual behavior and focusing on “the role norms play in influencing personal behavior 
and why changing them is a critical part of any campaign to make individuals more 
environmentally responsible”); Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides Theoretical 
Support for Making Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 515, 515–17 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Civic Republicanism] (noting 
that regulation of individual “behavior [has] either failed or not been tried” and describing 
“how the overlapping strands of republican thought and norm development support the 
creation of a new norm of personal environmental responsibility”); Hope M. Babcock, Global 
Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment for Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental 
Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Global Climate Change] 
(identifying difficulties with “legislat[ing] personal behavior” and concentrating instead on the 
development of environmental norms); Lin, supra note 12, at 1151–52 (observing that “direct 
regulation of individual behavior is not a panacea” and that “[t]argeting behavioral norms offers 
a less coercive and potentially less costly alternative for achieving individual behavioral 
change”); Vandenbergh, supra note 12, at 1103–04 (“Regulations that seek to direct personal 
behavior by fiat are exceedingly unpopular, and they are often inefficient and costly to 
enforce. . . . Norms appear to provide a ready answer, at least on the surface.”); Ela, supra note 
12, at 95 (“Law-and-norms theorists have long acknowledged the power of social influences to 
determine individual behavior, and some have championed efforts to manage social norms in 
situations where enforcement difficulties, transaction costs or political realities render other 
regulatory techniques—such as laws or economic incentives—inefficient or politically 
unpalatable. Such situations include many important environmental harms caused by 
individuals . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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untenable, primarily because their enforcement invades privacy or 
other civil liberties in a manner unpalatable to the public.21 This 
Article contributes to the existing literature by offering a more 
nuanced understanding of the obstacle posed by the intrusion 
objection and by suggesting that mandates might prove to be a more 
useful tool for changing individual behaviors than has previously been 
recognized. 
The existing literature’s relative inattention to direct mandates 
on environmentally significant individual behaviors stems from the 
perception that applying mandates to most environmentally 
significant individual behaviors would simply be infeasible. Two 
justifications are usually offered for this position:22 First, enforcing 
mandates against individuals would be difficult because individuals 
are numerous and spread out and because they frequently engage in 
environmentally significant behaviors in private. Detection and 
enforcement against individuals would be of questionable technical 
 
 21. This Article employs the term “intrusion objection” to refer to the argument, raised in 
the literature addressing environmentally significant individual behavior, that mandates on 
individual behavior have limited utility as a policy tool because politicians will encounter too 
much public opposition in trying to adopt them and that, even if such mandates were adopted, 
they would engender public outcry and be repealed or disobeyed. As discussed in Part I.C, the 
most frequent explanation offered in the literature for this public opposition is the perception 
that government regulation of these behaviors constitutes an invasion of privacy or an instance 
of government overreaching more generally. This Article does not attempt to define “intrusion” 
per se, although some interesting empirical work has been done attempting to gauge 
perceptions of intrusiveness in the context of the Fourth Amendment. See generally Christopher 
Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in 
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by 
Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (examining “how society perceives the ‘intrusiveness’ of 
government investigative methods”).  
 22. Of note, the use of mandates to change behavior generally has attracted significant 
criticism. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 14 (rev. and expanded ed. 2009) (defending 
libertarian paternalism as an alternative to mandates and arguing that “[i]n many domains, 
including environmental protection, family law, and school choice, . . . better governance 
requires less in the way of government coercion and constraint, and more in the way of freedom 
to choose”); Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 655, 659–62 (2006) (criticizing regulation by “fiat,” or through mandates, on a variety 
of grounds, including that limited enforcement undercuts deterrence, that widespread 
disobedience vests police officers with undue discretion, and that “[l]ow compliance rates 
can . . . harm the moral authority of the law”). Importantly, however, this Article does not 
advocate mandates as the only or even the primary policy tool for changing individual behavior. 
It posits more modestly that mandates might, in some circumstances, prove a useful tool for 
changing behavior, particularly in conjunction with other approaches, and it seeks to understand 
whether—and, if so, how—mandates can be deployed in this limited manner with respect to 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. 
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and administrative feasibility and would perhaps be prohibitively 
expensive.23 Second, even if mandates could be enforced in a cost-
effective manner, they would trigger insurmountable intrusion 
objections, as individuals would not accept government constraints, or 
the measures required to enforce them, in the context of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors.24 
The cost and administrative feasibility of imposing mandates on 
some environmentally significant individual behaviors might, 
however, be less daunting, or at least might pose less of an obstacle, 
than has been widely anticipated. A host of new technologies make it 
increasingly easier to identify and track environmental harms, 
including harms generated by individuals, through household energy 
consumption and waste production.25 Many environmentally 
 
 23. See Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 598 (“The thousands or millions of potential 
regulatory targets . . . , the widespread belief that individuals are not significant pollution 
sources, and the cognitive barriers to changing that belief all make individual behavior 
extremely difficult to regulate through command and control instruments . . . . To the extent 
environmental harms caused by individuals are difficult to detect, enforcement is expensive and 
intrusive.”).  
 24. See Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 20, at 5–6 (“Efforts to detect and 
ultimately enforce against environmentally harmful individual activities . . . would be costly for 
the government to carry out and would trigger enormous political resistance because of the 
interference with individual liberty and invasion of privacy.”); Lin, supra note 12, at 1152 
(“Often, command-and-control regulation of individuals is politically infeasible because of its 
perceived intrusiveness. . . . Command-and-control regulation of individuals can also be 
inefficient and costly to enforce because of the large number of regulatory targets, their 
dispersed nature, and the difficulty of detecting environmental harms.”); Vandenbergh, supra 
note 7, at 598–99 (“Even if sufficient resources were devoted to the [enforcement] effort, tbe 
[sic] intrusiveness of enforcing these regulations may undermine compliance or produce a 
political backlash. Empirical studies suggest that the difficulties of fully enforcing command and 
control approaches against individual behavior present tbe [sic] risk of increasing, rather than 
decreasing, environmental harms.”).  
 25. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 194 (summarizing Clive Thompson’s 
review of Southern California Edison’s creative efforts to encourage energy conservation, 
including the “Ambient Orb, a little ball that glows red when a customer is using lots of energy 
but green when energy use is modest”); JOSH WYATT, TEX. INSTRUMENTS, MAXIMIZING 
WASTE MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY THROUGH THE USE OF RFID 2–5 (2008), available at 
http://www.ti.com/rfid/docs/manuals/whtPapers/wp_lf_hdx.pdf (describing chips that can be 
installed in trash receptacles and then used to monitor household waste activities, including 
recycling); Frederick R. Fucci with Clara Vondrich & Annette Nichols, Alternative Energy 
Options for Buildings: Distributed Generation, in GREEN REAL ESTATE SUMMIT 2010, at 337, 
346–47 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 577, 2010) (describing how 
smart-metering devices allow utilities and consumers to track power use by individual 
appliances); Saqib Rahim, They Don’t Talk Trash, They Track It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/03/26/26climatewire-they-dont-talk-trash-they-track-it-
76922.html (describing a Massachusetts Institute of Technology program that tracks individual 
items of household trash and a device that monitors data about individual bicycle use); 
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significant individual behaviors—from solo commuting to the disposal 
of household waste—occur in contexts that have external aspects that 
can be detected from outside the home, thus facilitating enforcement. 
Piggybacking enforcement efforts on existing local regulation may 
also reduce administrative costs.26 And, most importantly, for 
purposes of enhancing norm campaigns, consistent enforcement may 
not be necessary: the enactment of mandates may exert an expressive 
effect even in the absence of rigorous enforcement.27 It is thus 
premature to dismiss individual mandates as technically or 
administratively infeasible in the field of environmental regulation. 
Yet even if the imposition of mandates on environmentally 
significant individual behaviors may in some circumstances be both 
technically and administratively feasible, policymakers must still 
contend with a core objection to the use of mandates: the intrusion 
objection. As Professor Hope Babcock suggests, mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors may prove too 
intrusive to adopt and enforce: 
Even if there were laws that reached these [environmentally 
significant individual] activities, there would be serious problems 
enforcing them. Efforts to detect and ultimately enforce against 
individual activities that usually occur at home or in the immediately 
 
Mandeep Singh, Pollution Watch Goes Online . . . , GULF DAILY NEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://
www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=297360 (describing “the world’s first 
country-wide online monitoring system to analyse pollution from factories and power 
stations”—a system that was launched in Bahrain and that “entails installing microprocessor-
based devices at selected companies” to “convey real time emission readings”); see also Lyndsey 
Layton, The Rush Is On To Make Food Traceable, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2011, at A1 (describing 
how “in some stores [consumers] can wave a smartphone above an apple or orange and learn 
instantly where it was grown, who grew it and whether it has been recalled”); Barry Paddock, 
Shirts Act as Toxin Police: Grad Students Create Color-Changing Clothes That Detect Foul Air, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2011, at 11 (describing shirts that change color when exposed to 
pollution); Jyoti Madhusoodanan, Cell Phone Cameras Help Monitor Atmospheric Black 
Carbon, MONGABAY.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://news.mongabay.com/2011/0201-black_carbon_
madhusoodanan.html (describing efforts to equip cell phones with an application that would 
visually reveal levels of black carbon and then to provide these cell phones to households in an 
attempt to encourage the adoption of clean-cook stoves).  
 26. Kuh, supra note 12, at 201–02. 
 27. See Babcock, supra note 3, at 148–49 (“A law by itself can influence the social meaning 
of actions and can influence what people think others might do.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2032–33 (1996) (“With or without 
enforcement activity, such laws can help reconstruct norms and the social meaning of action.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 958–59 (1996) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms] (observing that even rarely enforced laws shape social 
norms and meanings “because there is a general norm in favor of obeying the law” and because 
the laws “inculcate both shame and pride”). 
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surrounding area would trigger enormous political resistance, as 
they would be seen as an interference with individual liberty and an 
invasion of privacy.28 
 This objection is often raised to explain why mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors are not a promising 
policy tool for capturing individual harms.29 Although nowhere 
precisely defined, the intrusion objection is most commonly presented 
as being grounded in concerns about how government enforcement 
might infringe civil liberties—most notably privacy30—although at 
times it is characterized more broadly as a form of public or political 
 
 28. Babcock, supra note 4, at 123; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 598 (“To the 
extent environmental harms caused by individuals are difficult to detect, enforcement is 
expensive and intrusive. Even if sufficient resources were devoted to the effort, tbe [sic] 
intrusiveness of enforcing these regulations may undermine compliance or produce a political 
backlash.”).  
 29. E.g., Babcock, supra note 4, at 124 (asserting that Congress is especially unlikely to 
“amend our environmental laws to reach individual actions . . . when regulation is sought in an 
area where unrestricted individual choice has been (or is perceived to have been) the norm” 
(quoting Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. 
REV. 325, 346 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babcock, Civic Republicanism, 
supra note 20, at 515 (“For a variety of reasons, ranging from the difficulty of trying to identify 
and then regulate all of these individual sources to the political backlash that might result if such 
regulation was tried, efforts to control that behavior have either failed or not been tried.”); 
Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 20, at 5–6 (“Efforts to detect and ultimately 
enforce against environmentally harmful individual activities, many of which occur in and 
around the home, would be costly for the government to carry out and would trigger enormous 
political resistance because of the interference with individual liberty and invasion of privacy.”); 
Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (2001) (“When numerous 
people must act to solve a collective problem and lack the economic incentive to do so, 
traditional government regulation, such as formal law, may be infeasible, ineffectual, or 
politically difficult.”); Lin, supra note 12, at 1152 (“Often, command-and-control regulation of 
individuals is politically infeasible because of its perceived intrusiveness.”); Vandenbergh, supra 
note 7, at 598 (“[The] intrusiveness of enforcing [command-and-control] regulations may 
undermine compliance or produce a political backlash.”).  
 30. Babcock, supra note 4, at 123 (“Efforts to detect and ultimately enforce against 
individual activities that usually occur at home or in the immediately surrounding area would 
trigger enormous political resistance, as they would be seen as an interference with individual 
liberty and an invasion of privacy.”); Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 12, at 5–6 
(observing that efforts to detect and enforce laws designed to reach environmentally significant 
behaviors would be perceived as interfering with individual liberty and invading privacy and 
that “trying to legislate personal behavior would generate enormous ill will and be politically 
suicidal”); Carlson, supra note 29, at 1235 (referencing privacy concerns); Lin, supra note 12, at 
1152 (observing that the “perceived intrusiveness” of the command-and-control regulation of 
individuals renders that regulation “politically infeasible”). See generally Daniel J. Solove, A 
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 552–56 (2006) (offering a taxonomy of privacy 
that identifies “intrusion” as a type of privacy harm “involv[ing] invasions or incursions into 
one’s life” that “can be caused not only by physical incursion and proximity but also by gazes 
(surveillance) or questioning (interrogation)”). 
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resistance to government overreaching.31 Both the narrower, privacy-
based intrusion objection and the broader objection of government 
overreaching appear to be motivated by several factors: observations 
of earlier, unsuccessful attempts to mandate changes in 
environmentally significant individual behaviors; cognitive limitations 
that may prevent individuals from recognizing the individually de 
minimis, but collectively significant, harms that their actions impose 
on the environment; empirical studies suggesting that constraints on 
individual behaviors can engender backlash; and commonsense 
intuition about the limits of public tolerance for government 
intervention.32 Although it is not explicitly characterized as such, the 
intrusion objection constitutes a prediction by scholars about how the 
public and their elected representatives will respond to actual or 
proposed mandates on environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. 
In large measure, then, the intrusion objection rests on an 
unproven prediction about popular responses to mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. Importantly, 
however, the intrusion objection has yet to be subjected to critical 
examination that tests this prediction, and commentators have not yet 
completely assessed the source, scope, or intransigence of the 
intrusion objection or the obstacle that it may pose to the use of 
mandates to change environmentally significant individual behaviors. 
A better understanding of if, when, how, and why mandates on 
environmentally significant behaviors may trigger fatal intrusion 
objections could help to evaluate mandates as a policy tool for 
changing individual behaviors and could also provide guidance about 
how mandates might be structured to avoid such objections. 
This Article undertakes an initial effort to better define and 
understand the intrusion objection to the use of mandates to change 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. Part I surveys prior 
and existing laws aimed at impacting individual behaviors and 
associated environmental harms to develop a rough sense of when 
such regulations have and have not triggered intrusion objections. 
Part II then looks to some early privacy cases among the Court’s 
substantive due process jurisprudence for further guidance as to when 
 
 31. See Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 520, 598–600 (referencing both the potential 
intrusiveness required for enforcement and, more generally, the “public resistance to formal 
legal regulation of individual behavior”). 
 32. Babcock, supra note 4, at 123; Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 598.  
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and why government restrictions on individual freedom might give 
rise to intrusion objections. Although the intrusion objection arises 
from the hypothesized public rejection of mandates, as opposed to 
the constitutional infirmity of such measures, as explained in greater 
detail in Part II, adducing the constitutional boundaries imposed by 
substantive due process review can offer insight into when and why 
government constraints on individuals are most likely to be viewed as 
unacceptable overreaching. This is so because under substantive due 
process review, courts identify a fundamental right and forbid 
government action when they determine that the action crosses 
deeply rooted, traditional boundaries between government 
prerogatives and individual liberties.33 Part III builds on Parts I and II 
to offer a clearer understanding of the intrusion objection and 
suggests principles to guide the future development of mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors, proposing as an 
example an energy-waste ordinance designed to avoid intrusion 
objections. 
The Article concludes that the obstacle to direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors posed by the 
intrusion objection is both narrower and broader than presently 
recognized. The obstacle posed by the intrusion objection is narrower 
because although the enforcement of mandates against some 
primarily in-home behaviors may occasion insurmountable privacy or 
related objections, other environmentally significant individual 
behaviors can be and are regulated without triggering these 
objections. The obstacle posed by the intrusion objection is broader 
because perceived government intrusion is just one of the costs, along 
with monetary costs and inconvenience, that regulation may impose 
on individuals. The more salient dynamic is transparency; direct 
regulation, as opposed to indirect regulation, tends to make all of the 
costs of regulation to individuals more transparent, a phenomenon 
that may invite public or political resistance.34 This resistance, 
however, is not limited to direct regulation nor should it be presumed 
to invariably present an insurmountable obstacle to the use of direct 
 
 33. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (explaining the Court’s 
“established method of substantive-due-process analysis”). 
 34. See generally Lessig, supra note 10, at 690 (describing how indirect regulation may 
result in indirection by “achiev[ing] a political end that citizens need not directly attribute to the 
government’s choice”). 
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mandates to regulate environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. 
I.  SURVEYING REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO REDUCE INDIVIDUAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS 
Surveying existing regulation of, or past attempts to regulate, 
environmentally significant individual behaviors offers one way to 
better understand the intrusion objection. This Part provides a very 
broad overview35 of the regulation of environmentally significant 
individual behaviors. The overview charts the difference between 
indirect and direct regulation of environmentally significant 
individual behaviors and attempts to discern when, and to some 
extent why, intrusion objections arise, particularly with respect to 
direct regulation. Section A identifies indirect methods as the 
predominant method of seeking to change environmentally 
significant individual behaviors. Section B then identifies some 
instances in which environmental law imposes—or has attempted to 
impose—direct mandates on environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. This Part concludes by summarizing when and how 
intrusion objections have arisen with respect to both indirect and 
direct regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors 
and analyzing what this information reveals about the intrusion 
objection as an obstacle to the use of mandates in this area. 
A. Indirect Regulation of Environmentally Significant Individual 
Behaviors Is Common and Widely Accepted 
The government regularly nudges and prods Americans to 
behave in ways that are better for the environment.36 It designates 
 
 35. As explained in Part I.C, this overview is necessarily incomplete. In particular, a more 
thorough accounting of historical efforts to control individual environmental behaviors might 
provide additional insight. 
 36. Interestingly, in their book NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, supra note 22, Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein criticize 
the United States’ traditional reliance on command-and-control measures to reduce 
environmental harms and recommend greater reliance on indirect regulation or “choice 
architecture,” id. at 1–14. Specifically, they advocate economic-incentive systems—which 
directly regulate the market—and feedback and information—which, although aimed in some 
instances at individual behavior, do not mandate behavioral changes and perhaps more directly 
regulate norms. Id. at 183–96. In the narrow context of regulating individual behavior, however, 
indirect regulations—in other words, nudges—are perhaps better characterized as the 
traditional and predominant method of regulating individual behavior, whereas direct mandates 
are less common and are used less frequently, in particular with respect to federal 
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carpool lanes to reward those who share rides with a faster 
commute.37 It subsidizes public transportation and the purchase of 
hybrid vehicles to make cleaner travel less expensive.38 It permits 
manufacturers of energy-efficient products to market those products 
with special government seals of approval39 and polices green 
marketing claims to make sure that consumers are not misled about 
the environmental attributes of the products they purchase.40 It 
sponsors public-service campaigns exhorting people to “Give a Hoot” 
and, more recently, to “Change a Light, Change the World” by 
buying energy-efficient lighting; to “Turn Over a New Leaf” by 
buying SmartWay cars, certified by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA); and to “Plug-In To eCycling” by recycling cell 
phones.41 It charges bottle deposits to encourage recycling and 
discourage littering42 and bars large grocery stores from distributing 
 
environmental policy. For example, in his book, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, 
NATURE AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, Professor Jason Czarnezki reviews 
existing efforts to influence the environmental impacts of a variety of everyday, individual 
behaviors. Notably, these efforts are overwhelmingly indirect. See, e.g., id. at 41–47 (examining 
efforts to increase household energy efficiency and identifying only one effort that could be best 
characterized as a direct mandate on individual behavior: local limits on the use of leaf blowers 
during ozone action days). 
 37. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 146 (2006) (authorizing funds for carpool and vanpool projects); 
23 U.S.C. § 149(b)(5) (2006) (setting out requirements for a congestion-mitigation and air-
quality-improvement program); 23 U.S.C. § 166 (2006) (expanding eligibility to use high-
occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes to hybrid and low-emission vehicles); see also CAL. VEH. CODE 
§ 5205.5 (West Supp. 2011) (enacting a decal program for energy-efficient vehicles to allow 
them to use HOV lanes). 
 38. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 30 (2006) (granting a tax credit for a percentage of the cost of 
buying an electric car); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3377 (Supp. 2010) (granting a tax credit for 
qualified owners of fuel-efficient vehicles); W. VA. CODE ANN. 11-6D-1 (LexisNexis 2008 & 
Supp. 2011) (creating an alternative-fuel-motor-vehicles tax credit and an alternative-fuel-
infrastructure tax credit); see also CZARNEZKI, supra note 3, at 47–49 (describing subsidy 
programs for the purchase of hybrid cars).  
 39. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2006) (establishing Energy 
Star, “a voluntary program to identify and promote energy-efficient products and buildings”); 
About Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_index 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (describing federal Energy Star programs).  
 40. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1–.8 (2011) (setting forth the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) 
Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims). The FTC proposed revisions to the 
Green Guides in 2010. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 
63,552 (proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). 
 41. See, e.g., Public Service Announcements, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/newsroom/psa.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2011) (describing a number of EPA public 
service announcements).  
 42. See Beverage Container Recycling and Litter Reduction Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§§ 14500–14599 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); Beverage Container Deposit, IOWA CODE 
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plastic bags to customers.43 It encourages household energy efficiency 
through a growing array of measures including tax rebates and pricing 
mechanisms. Examples of these latter strategies include charging 
more for energy use above a set baseline; implementing 
weatherization programs that make homes more energy efficient; 
installing smart meters; and orchestrating public-information and 
marketing campaigns, including neighbor-to-neighbor education 
programs.44  
The government also imposes upstream mandates that limit the 
environmental harms occasioned by a variety of individual behaviors. 
A host of product mandates dictate the permissible amount of energy 
that may be used by a variety of appliances and products, including 
specifying a miles-per-gallon requirement for vehicles.45 These 
mandates are directed to the product manufacturers, but they 
effectively limit individual choice by restricting the types of products 
that are available to buy, thereby also limiting the environmental 
harms occasioned by, for example, taking a drive or using a 
refrigerator. Green building and zoning codes similarly dictate 
requirements for the built environment.46 These codes can be 
 
§§ 455C.1–.17 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); Returnable Container Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
LAW §§ 27-1001 to -1019 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2011).  
 43. See Plastic Bag Reduction Ordinance, S.F., CAL., ENVIR. CODE §§ 1701–1709 (2011).  
 44. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115, for example, included substantial funding for energy-efficiency programs, see id. div. A, tit. 
IV, 123 Stat. 138–40 (providing funding for “Weatherization Assistance Program[s],” the 
“manufacturing of advanced batteries and components,” and “energy storage research,” among 
other informal programs); see also Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart 
Grid: Network Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 833, 857–59 (2010) (listing a variety of energy-efficiency-promoting policy tools, 
including smart meters). For an overview of state and federal efficiency measures, see SARAH 
SCHINDLER, ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1, 3–7 (2011). See 
also CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 739 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (setting baseline quantities, rates, 
and disclosure requirements for energy usage); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8366(a) (West Supp. 
2011) (mandating an evaluation of the impact of “[i]mplementation of new advanced metering 
initiatives”).  
 45. For example, federal law sets minimum energy-efficiency requirements for a variety of 
appliances, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–6309 (2006), in addition to 
average fuel-economy standards for new vehicles, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–32919 (2006).  
 46. Although in some sense, these requirements are mandates directed to individuals at the 
juncture of construction or renovation, they do not directly operate on specific day-to-day 
behaviors. Nevertheless, such regulations indirectly constrain behavior and are best viewed as a 
regulation of architecture, as opposed to individuals. Thus, for present purposes I characterize 
zoning and building codes primarily as a direct regulation of architecture that indirectly 
regulates individuals. This characterization is, however, not entirely satisfying. In some 
circumstances, zoning and building codes do apply directly to individuals and constrain use of 
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designed to limit environmental harms by encouraging individuals to 
reduce their energy consumption. For example, mixed-use zoning can 
discourage car use by locating residences within walking distance of 
necessary services, and the mandated use of energy-efficient building 
materials can reduce heat or air-conditioning demand.47 
These are just a few examples that are part of a web of regulation 
designed to indirectly change individual behaviors and limit 
associated environmental harms.48 These indirect methods of 
influencing individual behaviors are common, and though they may 
 
their property for environmental ends. Christopher Serkin’s interesting article, Existing Uses 
and the Limits of Land Use Regulation, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222 (2009), which identifies and 
critically examines the robust protections afforded to existing uses in property law, suggests an 
alternative way to more precisely identify when zoning and building codes function to regulate 
individuals directly rather than indirectly, id. at 1230 (refuting the “assum[ption] that there is 
something different . . . about the unfairness associated with regulating existing as opposed to 
future uses”). Namely, such regulations might be viewed as indirect with respect to individuals 
who are prospective homeowners, renters, or residents—and who thus are likely to experience 
the codes primarily in terms of how they have already defined existing architecture—but direct 
when they affect an existing property owner’s use or renovation.  
 47. For a good account of the principles of green building and its evolution from reliance 
on informational/voluntary approaches to mandatory requirements, see Hirokawa, supra note 6, 
at 511–19, 545–46. See also BOS., MASS., ZONING CODE § 37-4 (2010) (requiring adherence to 
the U.S. Green Building Council’s LEED Certified standard as part of the private-development 
review process); CZARNEZKI, supra note 3, at 43–45 (describing green building and zoning 
codes); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and the Greening of Comprehensive Plans and Land 
Use Regulations, in LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT 
DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION 437, 440–41 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2008) (promoting 
successful local-government initiatives to curb global warming and encourage sustainable 
development).  
 48. Of course, in addition to these indirect regulations that have as an express purpose 
either changing environmentally significant individual behaviors or limiting the environmental 
harms arising from those behaviors, there is an enormous volume of regulation that, though not 
aimed at influencing individual behaviors or their associated harms, nonetheless significantly 
shapes—and frequently increases—the environmental harms imposed by individuals. See 
CZARNEZKI, supra note 3, at 48–49, 66–68 (identifying policies that encourage individual 
lifestyles and decisions that are harmful for the environment, such as highway funding and 
agricultural subsidies); John Dernbach, Creating the Law of Environmentally Sustainable 
Economic Development, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 614, 635 (2011) (discussing the negative 
environmental impacts of policies that encourage unsustainable development, including public 
funding for highways, single-use zoning, and the federal mortgage-interest tax deduction). 
Examples include everything from oil-energy-industry subsidies, see NAT’L COMM’N ON 
ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY STALEMATE: A BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET 
AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES 6 (2004), to agriculture policy, see Carrie Lowry La Seur & 
Adam D.K. Abelkop, Forty Years After NEPA’s Enactment It Is Time for a Comprehensive 
Farm Bill Environmental Impact Statement, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 204–10 (2010), and 
transportation and housing policies, see John Turner & Jason Rylander, Land Use: The 
Forgotten Agenda, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 60, 64 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty 
eds., 1997). 
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trigger public opposition, such opposition is not held up as a major 
impediment to the use of indirect regulation generally.49 The tendency 
to identify the intrusion objection as a significant obstacle primarily 
or exclusively with respect to direct mandates persists even though 
indirect measures may require the collection of personal information50 
and may spur objections that sound quite like intrusion objections.51 
The installation in California of smart meters, for example, which 
collect detailed information about an individual’s electricity usage in 
an effort to change societal norms and encourage voluntary changes 
in energy use by individuals, has occasioned opposition on the ground 
that the meters constitute a “breach of privacy.”52 
Similarly, the federal statutory scheme of environmental 
protection in large measure reaches individual behaviors and 
associated environmental harms only indirectly.53 The core provisions 
of major American environmental statutes impose restraints 
primarily on larger entities engaged in resource extraction—waste 
creation as a result of manufacturing or production, for example—or 
 
 49. One specific form of indirect regulation aimed at individual behaviors—taxes or other 
significant price increases—is generally recognized as giving rise to often-insurmountable public 
opposition. See NORDHAUS, supra note 14, at 16 (describing the difficulties in gaining public 
support for direct increases in the price of energy); Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 604 
(observing that taxes “are politically radioactive in the United States to such an extent that they 
are not of more than theoretical interest, at least in the near term”); Vandenbergh & 
Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1703–04 (observing that, like direct regulation, taxes “have 
generated a fierce backlash in the past”). 
 50. One scholar suggests, as an innovative approach to spur the development of energy-
saving norms, that “Congress could require the collection and publication of information on 
individuals’ energy footprint.” John Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater 
U.S. Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15, 36 (2007). 
 51. Felicity Barringer, New Meters Stir Fears for Health and Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2011, at A12 (citing privacy concerns about the collection of home-energy-use data by a utility 
company using real-time smart meters).  
 52. Id. Notably, in Maryland, where the installation of smart meters was at first linked to 
peak-demand pricing, the proposal attracted significant opposition from consumer groups 
concerned about rising electricity bills and was initially rejected by the Maryland Public Service 
Commission, although it was ultimately approved in revised form. Vandenbergh et al., supra 
note 13, at 739 & n.97. 
 53. See Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 597–98 (“[T]he vast majority of the command and 
control regulations that seek to reduce environmental harms from individuals take the form of 
emissions controls directed at the industrial facilities that produce consumer products or 
restrictions on the environmentally harmful characteristics of consumer products, whether 
automobiles, thermostats, or home cleansers.”); see also Scott D. Anderson, Comment, 
Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts Approach, 26 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339, 367, 385 (1999) (“By relying primarily on regulation of industrial and 
municipal discharges, the general public has only indirectly contributed to cleaning up our 
waterways through higher consumer prices and sewer bills.”). 
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waste disposal.54 Ultimately, these entities only engage in these 
resource-extracting and waste-creating processes to satisfy the 
demands of individual consumption.55 By limiting the environmental 
harms associated with manufacturing and producing these products, 
the regulatory regime indirectly limits the environmental harms that 
individuals contribute to by consuming those products.56 For example, 
a host of environmental statutes impose restrictions on the harvesting 
of trees and the process of manufacturing paper, including the 
ultimate disposal of generated waste.57 By limiting the environmental 
harm generated by these processes, the statutes also limit the 
environmental harm chargeable to individuals when they use paper. It 
is fair to characterize environmental law and policy as imposing direct 
regulation primarily on larger, institutional entities while addressing 
individual behaviors primarily through indirect regulation.58 
But some laws—in particular local laws—do directly regulate 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. Examples of these 
laws, and explanations of whether and why they have triggered 
intrusion or other public objections, are considered in the next 
Section. 
 
 54. See Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 523–36, 565–67, 577–79 (noting that the government 
“rarely, if ever,” enforces environmental statutes against individuals and instead uses “voluntary 
collection stations” and “public information campaigns” to alter individual behavior).  
 55. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 1244–45, 1255–56 (lamenting the law’s focus on pollution 
control and explaining the need to address consumption, but noting that regulating consumption 
is difficult).  
 56. Id. at 1267–68 (discussing environmental law’s narrow focus on the patterns of 
consumption and its failure to address levels of consumption).  
 57. The Forest Service regulates the harvest of timber on federal lands under the National 
Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3) (2006), and paper mills must usually 
obtain permits under the CWA, 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (2011), and the CAA, 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.280–
.285, pt. 63 (2011).  
 58. Notably, this reliance on indirect regulation and the paucity of direct regulation in the 
context of environmental controls directed at individuals may be unusual. In his article 
Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, supra note 22, Professor Edward K. 
Cheng posits that direct regulation of behavior—what he terms “fiat”—is the dominant method 
employed to control behavior in other contexts, including criminal law, see id. at 715 
(“Historically, attempts to change behavior have been addressed primarily through fiat—legal 
prohibitions with accompanying penalties for non-compliance.”).  
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B. Direct Regulation of Environmentally Significant Individual 
Behaviors 
A variety of local ordinances and state laws directly regulate 
environmentally significant individual behaviors.59 Many 
municipalities require that individuals sort their trash to separate out 
recyclable, and sometimes even compostable, waste, and some 
jurisdictions impose bans on the disposal of certain types of waste.60 
Local and state burn laws61 restrict or bar individuals from burning 
solid fuels—for example, by limiting or prohibiting the use of 
fireplaces or wood stoves.62 Numerous jurisdictions limit the amount 
of time that individuals may idle vehicles or other emission-
generating equipment.63 Prohibitions on littering are ubiquitous.64 
 
 59. For an overview of some such measures, see Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 599 & 
n.321. 
 60. E.g., S.F., CAL., ENVIR. CODE §§ 1901–1912 (2011) (requiring the separation of trash, 
compostable materials, and recyclables); NANTUCKET, MASS., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 125-2, 
-5 (2009) (same); N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 16, § 1-08(g) (2009) (“[R]esidents . . . of residential 
buildings . . . shall . . . separate from other materials designated recyclable materials that are 
required to be recycled and shall place such separated materials in the appropriate 
containers . . . .”); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 619.06(c) (2011) (requiring the 
separation of trash and recyclables); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 21.36.083 (2011) (same); 
see also CZARNEZKI, supra note 3, at 50 n.55 (citing waste-disposal bans in Arizona, 
Connecticut, Idaho, and Maine); Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 567 n.190 (identifying state 
disposal bans and observing that disposal bans became more common during the 1990s). 
 61. State and local burn laws have long existed to address both local air pollution and fire 
concerns. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE. § 4423 (1972). They are now widespread, adopted in 
some instances as part of state implementation of federal CAA requirements. See, e.g., 
Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans: Idaho, 61 Fed. Reg. 27,019, 27,019–
23 (May 30, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (describing modifications to Idaho’s burn laws 
to satisfy CAA requirements).  
 62. E.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 58.01.01.317 (2011); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-433-
010 to -200 (2010); Sacramento Cnty., Cal., Mandatory Episodic Curtailment of Wood and 
Other Solid Fuel Burning §§ 100–400 (2011).  
 63. E.g., SACRAMENTO, CAL., CITY CODE §§ 8.116.010−.110 (2011) (requiring private-
property owners to ensure that they do not allow commercial vehicles to idle on their property 
for more than five minutes and prohibiting individuals from idling certain gasoline-powered 
equipment, marine vessels, and off-road equipment); DENVER, COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 4-43 (2011) (prohibiting idling for more than five minutes, with a few exceptions); N.Y.C., 
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 24-163 (2009) (“No person shall cause or permit the engine of a motor 
vehicle, other than a legally authorized emergency motor vehicle, to idle for longer than three 
minutes . . . .”); BURLINGTON, VT., CODE § 20-55(e) (2011) (“No person shall leave idling for 
more than three (3) minutes any motor vehicle in any area of the city [with certain limited 
exceptions].”). As with burn laws, restrictions on idling are sometimes enacted to comply with 
federal CAA requirements. See, e.g., TEX. NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION COMM’N, RULE 
LOG NO. 2000-011-SIP-AI,  REVISIONS TO THE STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (SIP) FOR THE 
CONTROL OF OZONE AIR POLLUTION app. J (2000), available at http://www.tceq.texas.gov/
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Municipalities also commonly adopt water-conservation ordinances 
that prohibit or limit the time or duration of outdoor water use, 
require the use of hoses that have an automatic shut-off nozzle, bar 
the washing of impervious surfaces, or require the installation of low-
flow fixtures before the sale or major modification of a residential 
home.65 Many jurisdictions have tree-protection ordinances that limit 
the circumstances under which an individual may cut down a tree, 
even on private property.66 A number of states have recently enacted 
e-waste recycling laws that prohibit individuals from disposing of 
certain types of electronics as household waste destined for municipal 
landfills.67 New Jersey recently adopted strict rules governing the 
 
airquality/sip/dec2000hgb.html (describing State Implementation Plan (SIP) modifications, 
including enhanced idling restrictions). 
 64. E.g., Florida Litter Law, FLA. STAT. § 403.413 (2010); LINCOLN CNTY., OR., ENVIR. & 
HEALTH CODE § 2.1505 (2011) (setting forth littering prohibitions).  
 65. S.F., CAL., HOUS. CODE §§ 12A05–12A10 (2011) (requiring a qualified inspector to 
determine whether fixtures must be replaced and whether showers, faucets, and toilets are low-
flow versions before sale); TAMPA BAY, FLA., CODE § 26–97(c) (2011) (providing that year-
round, residential users are limited to using hoses that have an automatic shut-off nozzle; to 
watering outdoors two days per week, depending on what number their address ends in; and to 
watering during particular hours of the day); RIO RANCHO, N.M., CODE §§ 52.01–.09 (2011) 
(prohibiting water waste—the “non-beneficial use” of water—and fugitive water—water that 
runs from one property to another or to a public right of way—but excluding storm-water 
runoff); EL PASO, TEX., CODE § 15.13.020 (2011) (setting forth a year-round restriction that 
residents with even-numbered addresses may only water their lawns and outdoor plants with 
public water on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, whereas odd-numbered addresses may 
only do so on Wednesdays, Fridays, and Sundays; and prohibiting all outdoor watering between 
the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. from April 1 to September 30); EL PASO, TEX., CODE 
§ 15.13.030(B) (prohibiting the waste of water, a violation that includes allowing the runoff of 
water from a residential property to form a pool in a street, alley, or ditch, or to run into a storm 
drain; failing to repair a leak within five days of discovering it; or washing impervious surfaces 
such as sidewalks, paved driveways, or patios except in an emergency); Outside Water Usage, 
WATER AUTH. OF W. NASSAU CNTY., http://www.wawnc.org/cm/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=26 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (prohibiting outdoor water 
use from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. year-round and providing that odd-numbered addresses may water 
only on odd-numbered days and even-numbered addresses may only water on even-numbered 
days). 
 66. For a detailed discussion of tree-protection ordinances, see Keith H. Hirokawa, 
Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local Environmental Law, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
760, 805–07 (2011). See also ATLANTA, GA., MUN. CODE §§ 158-28, -101 to -102 (2011) (placing 
strict limits on the removal of trees from public property and setting out the justification for that 
policy). 
 67. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-636 (2011) (providing that, as of January 2, 2011, no person 
may dispose of covered electronic devices in the garbage); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-99.109 
(West 2011) (providing that, beginning January 1, 2011, disposal of classified electronic waste as 
household trash is prohibited); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-2611(3) (McKinney 2011) 
(prohibiting individuals from disposing of electronic waste in solid-waste-management facilities 
beginning in 2015). 
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content and application of fertilizers.68 And some jurisdictions are 
either considering or have recently adopted bans on felt-soled boots 
and waders; those bans are aimed at reducing the spread of invasive 
species, which can attach to that common fishing gear.69 
These laws are generally enforced through fines; some authorize 
enforcement-related inspections—for example, of trash containers—
and some water-conservation ordinances even authorize cutting off 
water service for repeat violators.70 One unusual enforcement 
mechanism is the use of radiofrequency identification (RFID) tags to 
monitor and track residential garbage volume and/or recycling rates.71 
Notably, this method of enforcement has occasioned accusations of 
government snooping.72 Although anti-littering ordinances, recycling 
requirements, and other mandates on individuals are not always 
welcomed, their ubiquity and longevity suggest that direct regulation 
 
 68. Act of Jan. 5, 2011, ch. 112, § 2(a), 2010 N.J. ALS 112 (N.J.) (LEXIS) (codified at N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-62(a) (West Supp. 2011)) (“No person shall: (1) apply fertilizer to turf 
when a heavy rainfall, as shall be defined by the Office of the New Jersey State Climatologist at 
Rutgers, the State University, is occurring or predicted or when soils are saturated and a 
potential for fertilizer movement off-site exists; (2) apply any fertilizer intended for use on turf 
to an impervious surface, and any fertilizer inadvertently applied to an impervious surface shall 
be swept or blown back onto the target surface or returned to either its original or another 
appropriate container for reuse; or (3) apply fertilizer containing phosphorus or nitrogen to turf 
before March 1st or after November 15th in any calendar year, or at any time when the ground 
is frozen, except as provided otherwise in subsection b. of this section.”).  
 69. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4616 (2011) (“It is unlawful to use external felt-soled 
boots or external felt-soled waders in the waters of Vermont, except that a state or federal 
employee or emergency personnel, including fire, law enforcement, and EMT personnel, may 
use external felt-soled boots or external felt-soled waders in the discharge of official duties.”); 
Preliminary Summary, ALASKA BD. OF FISHERIES, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?
adfg=lib.forcedownload&filepath=/static/regulations/regprocess/fisheriesboard/pdfs/2009-2010/
statewide2010/&filename=statewide-finfish-2010-summ.pdf&contenttype=application/pdf (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2012) (recording the adoption of a felt-soled wading-boot ban beginning January 
1, 2012); see also Felicity Barringer, Anglers Bring Unwanted Guests to Rivers, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB. (Paris), Aug. 17, 2010, at 4 (describing the conservation rationales for the bans and 
mentioning the Alaska and Vermont bans as well as a proposed ban in Maryland). 
 70. S.F., CAL., ENVIR. CODE § 1908 (2011) (authorizing inspection of trash receptacles and 
fines of up to $100 for households that fail to properly sort their recyclables or compostables); 
RIO RANCHO, N.M., CODE § 52.07 (2011) (establishing a scheme of increasing fines for repeat 
offenders and authorizing water service to be discontinued if the fines are not paid). 
 71. See Benjamin Lanka, Radio Tags To Track Recycling Carts’ Use, J. GAZETTE (Fort 
Wayne, Ind.), Oct. 17, 2010, at 4 (describing the use of RFID chips by different communities). 
 72. See Wendy McElroy, Big Brother Is Watching You Recycle, 60 FREEMAN 17, 17–18 
(2010) (recognizing that the strongest objections against the monitoring are based upon privacy 
concerns); Editorial, Tattletale Trash Cans, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at B2 (stating that the 
government is spying on trash). 
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of some environmentally significant individual behaviors enjoys 
general acceptance in many areas.73 
Although not aimed primarily at individual behaviors, a number 
of federal statutes, sometimes implemented by state and local 
authorities through cooperative-federalism arrangements, also 
directly regulate environmentally significant individual behaviors. As 
illustrated in later Sections, some of these efforts have encountered 
significant difficulties.74 
1. Clean Air Act.  Under the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s)75 
cooperative-federalism arrangement,76 most states are afforded the 
authority to decide how to achieve federal national air-quality 
standards within their boundaries by obtaining federal approval of 
State Implementation Plans (SIPs).77 In determining which sources to 
target for emission reductions sufficient to achieve national air-
quality standards, states have sometimes chosen—or have been 
compelled by the magnitude of needed emission reductions78—to 
 
 73. See generally El Paso Launches Its Own Water Rationing Program, TULSA WORLD, 
Apr. 4, 1991, at A16 (describing the reaction of El Paso residents to water-use restrictions); 
Suzanne Gamboa, El Paso Begins Drive To Save Water, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Apr. 2, 1991, 
at 13A (reporting the local response to conservation measures); Edmund Archuleta, El Paso 
Helps Itself Through Water Conservation, TEXAS WATER MATTERS (Oct. 2, 2005), http://www.
texaswatermatters.org/pdfs/news_270.pdf (reciting the benefits of water conservation to El Paso 
residents); Eric Schmitt, Nassau County Learns To Live with Less Water, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
1988, at B23 (describing the reaction of Nassau County residents to water restrictions); Aubin 
Tyler, The Case for Mandatory Composting, BOS. GLOBE MAG., Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.
boston.com/bostonglobe/magazine/articles/2010/03/21/the_case_for_mandatory_composting 
(commenting on the success of the Nantucket composting ordinance and observing that “[f]or 
island residents, it’s now second nature to divide trash into two streams: recycling and organic 
waste”).  
 74. See Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 520 (reviewing efforts to regulate individual 
behaviors, primarily under federal environmental statutes; noting that “[t]he same pattern has 
occurred in area after area: regulators have sought to impose restrictions on individual behavior 
only rarely, and when they have done so, the restrictions have been unpopular and have 
provoked a public backlash;” and concluding that “[p]erhaps as a result, few regulations focus 
directly on individual behavior, and those that do are rarely enforced”).  
 75. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).  
 76. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (establishing the guidelines for SIPs). 
 77. See generally Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 99 (1975) (confirming 
that states retain the authority to choose how to reduce emissions to meet national ambient-air-
quality standards (NAAQS) when developing SIPs under the CAA). 
 78. Notably, states retain the authority to require emission reductions even when those 
reductions are claimed to be economically or technologically impossible for regulated entities. 
See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976) (holding that the EPA administrator 
need not consider economic or technological feasibility in reviewing SIPs). 
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regulate individual behaviors that contribute to air pollution.79 Burn 
laws and idling restrictions are thus sometimes enacted to satisfy 
CAA requirements.80 Another notable example is the 
“‘environmental’ speed limit”81 imposed by the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality in an effort to reduce emissions and satisfy 
CAA requirements.82 As characterized in the local press, “The 
measure was vilified from the start and drew heated negative 
response from drivers.”83 The initial speed-limit reductions were 
repealed after less than seven months when modeling showed that the 
reduced speed limits yielded a relatively insignificant reduction in 
emissions,84 and the Texas legislature passed legislation prospectively 
barring the Texas Transportation Commission from approving new 
environmental speed limits going forward. Nevertheless, some five-
miles-per-hour speed-limit reductions remain in effect in some Texas 
counties.85 
 
 79. Nonattainment areas, for example, may be required in some circumstances to include 
transportation-control measures in their SIPs. CAA § 182, 42 U.S.C. § 7511a. Transportation-
control measures can include direct regulation of individuals: for example, trip-reduction 
ordinances or vehicle-idling restrictions. Id. § 108(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 93.101 (2011) (defining a transportation-control measure as one “of the type[] listed in section 
108 of the CAA, or any other measure for the purpose of reducing emissions or concentrations 
of air pollutants from transportation sources by reducing vehicle use or changing traffic flow or 
congestion conditions”). 
 80. See supra notes 61–63.  
 81. Tony Freemantle, 55 MPH Begins Signing Off Freeways This Week, HOUS. CHRON., 
Nov. 5, 2002, at A1. 
 82. The SIP revision authorizing environmental speed limits is available from the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality. SIP Revision: Dallas-Fort Worth, April 19, 2000, TEX. 
COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/sip/apr2000dfw.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2012); see also Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; the 
Dallas/Fort Worth Nonattainment Area; Ozone, 66 Fed. Reg. 4756, 4759–60 (proposed Jan. 18, 
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (outlining Texas’s “Emission Control Strategies,” 
including new fuel regulations, vehicle-inspection requirements, and speed-limit reductions).  
 83. Freemantle, supra note 81. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.353(j) (West 2011) (“The commission may not 
determine or declare, or agree to determine or declare, a prima facie speed limit for 
environmental purposes on a part of the highway system.”); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 7, 
at 556 (“[S]tate and local efforts to reduce emissions by reducing speed limits have been hugely 
unpopular.”). More information about these environmental speed limits is available from the 
North Central Texas Council of Governments, 1-Hour Attainment Demonstration SIP: Speed 
Limit Reduction Measure, N. CENT. TEX. COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, http://www.nctcog.org/trans/air/
sip/previous/esl/index.asp (last updated Dec. 12, 2011), and from the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality, Vehicular Speed-Limit Reduction, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 
http://www.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/mobilesource/speedlimit.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).  
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The EPA also possesses statutory authority to mandate the 
inclusion of some specific types of controls on individual behaviors in 
state SIPs.86 In some circumstances, the EPA requires states to 
include vehicle-inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs in their 
SIPs when, for example, regions have failed to meet air-quality 
standards.87 Although state I/M programs vary with respect to both 
the individuals covered and the other implementation details—for 
example, whether the checks are annual or biennial, or where the 
checks can be conducted—the core element of an I/M program is the 
requirement that covered individuals test the tailpipe emissions from 
their vehicles.88 Owners usually cannot obtain required registrations 
for their vehicles unless they pass the emissions test, and thus, 
vehicles that fail required emissions tests must generally be repaired 
or even scrapped.89 In short, I/M programs impose significant 
restraints directly upon individuals: first, individuals must test their 
cars to obtain permission to drive them, and second, individuals may 
not drive their cars if they emit pollutants above the prescribed level. 
Adducing the significance of these I/M programs for purposes of 
better understanding the intrusion objection is complicated. The 
EPA’s efforts to require I/M programs, initiated in 1977,90 have 
occasioned over thirty years of controversy and disputes about 
everything from the EPA’s authority to require states to implement 
these programs,91 to the appropriate design and stringency of I/M 
programs,92 to the efficacy of those programs that have been 
implemented.93 States, envisioned in the CAA’s cooperative-
 
 86. Absent specific statutory authority, however, EPA may not generally prescribe the 
exact measures to be incorporated into a SIP to meet the NAAQS. See, e.g., Virginia v. EPA, 
108 F.3d 1397, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (invalidating an EPA SIP call). 
 87. E.g., Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 182, 187, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a, 7512a (2006); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 51.350 (2011) (outlining the applicability of I/M plans). 
 88. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.351–.353 (demonstrating the variability of SIP plans).  
 89. Id. § 51.361 (describing the required I/M enforcement mechanisms). 
 90. Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters To Clear the Air: Some Difficulties in 
Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1554 & n.211 (1996). 
 91. For example, the EPA initially sought to require states to issue I/M regulations, but it 
subsequently changed its approach after numerous legal challenges. See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 
99, 104 (1977) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding cases due to an EPA policy change). 
 92. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding 
EPA regulations promulgating guidelines for enhanced state vehicle I/M programs). 
 93. See McGarity, supra note 90, at 1535–1618 (detailing the fraught implementation of 
vehicle I/M requirements); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Barry Needleman, Control of Air Pollution 
from Mobile Sources Through Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
409, 414–19 (1993) (commenting on states’ recalcitrance, court challenges to the EPA’s 
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federalism scheme as the chief implementers of the CAA’s 
requirements,94 proved recalcitrant with respect to the establishment 
and operation of I/M programs.95 One source of this recalcitrance was 
public resistance to the expense, inconvenience, and perceived 
heavyhandedness of I/M requirements.96 The years saw repeated 
implementation delays,97 judicial98 and legislative limits placed on the 
EPA’s authority,99 and the gradual weakening of the EPA’s 
requirements for I/M programs.100 
It is tempting to explain the difficulties attending the 
establishment and operation of I/M programs as straightforward 
evidence of the intrusion objection at work. An observer adopting 
that account would say that a significant restraint on environmentally 
significant individual behaviors was perceived as unacceptably 
intrusive, occasioned public outcry, and was politically stymied at 
every turn. A fuller explanation, however, suggests that such an 
account would be incomplete, if not incorrect. First, although it is true 
that I/M program requirements sparked public outcry, individuals 
appear to have objected primarily to the inconvenience of the 
requirements, as opposed to the government invasion of privacy or 
 
authority to require I/M programs, and the EPA’s relaxation of I/M requirements in light of 
state resistance). See generally Jerome Ostrov, Inspection and Maintenance of Automotive 
Pollution Controls: A Decade-Long Struggle Among Congress, EPA and the States, 8 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 139 (1984). 
 94. See McGarity, supra note 90, at 1619 (explaining the need for state cooperation in 
implementing I/M programs). 
 95. Id. at 1619–25. 
 96. See Ora Fred Harris, Jr., The Automobile Emissions Control Inspection and 
Maintenance Program: Making It More Palatable to “Coerced” Participants, 49 LA. L. REV. 
1315, 1347 (1989) (discussing various rationales for public objections to the I/M program and 
recommending the “use of economic incentives to stimulate popular support for the I/M 
program”). 
 97. E.g., Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(c), 104 Stat. 2399, 2406–08 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006)) (extending the deadlines for SIP submittals). For an 
extensive discussion of the troubled implementation of the I/M program, see McGarity, supra 
note 90, at 1535–1618. 
 98. E.g., Brown v. EPA, 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that the EPA did not have 
the authority to impose sanctions on California for failing to adopt an EPA-developed I/M 
program). For an extensive discussion of this and other court challenges to the EPA’s 
administration of the I/M program, see McGarity, supra note 90, at 1535–1618. 
 99. For example, Congress barred the EPA from imposing construction moratoria on 
states that had failed to meet a December 31, 1982, deadline to show how they would attain the 
NAAQS. Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies 
Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-45, tit. II, 97 Stat. 219, 226 (1983).  
 100. McGarity, supra note 90, at 1535–1600. 
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liberty that they effected.101 Moreover, individuals surveyed about the 
car inspections indicated that they did not find the process unduly 
troublesome and that they tended to support I/M programs 
generally.102 Second, although public objection contributed to state 
opposition to I/M programs, it was only one of a number of factors 
informing that opposition. States also chafed at the Act’s cooperative-
federalism arrangement;103 took issue with the EPA’s initial attempts 
to force them to implement CAA programs;104 disagreed with basic 
CAA goals;105 and quickly piggybacked on the concessions that other 
states had been able to win from the EPA regarding deadlines, I/M 
requirements, and other measures of compliance.106 Finally, despite all 
 
 101. See id. at 1601–03 (noting complaints about wait times, dirtied seat covers, and the ways 
in which the test caused cars not to function properly); Bill Dawson, Waits Choke Some Drivers 
as State’s Smog-Checks Get in Gear, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 13, 1994, at A17 (reporting 
complaints about wait times and general annoyance with new I/M requirements in the early 
days of their implementation); Steve Strunsky, It Could Be Worse. It Could Be Texas., N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/16/nyregion/driving-it-could-be-worse-it-
could-be-texas.html (reporting discontent with the wait times and inconvenience associated with 
New Jersey’s I/M program but also reporting overall support for emissions testing). 
 102. See McGarity, supra note 90, at 1604 (observing that comment cards submitted by 
individuals in the early days of the Texas I/M program were generally positive); Strunsky, supra 
note 101 (reporting on a New Jersey poll finding that “8 in 10 respondents supported the 
enhanced inspection program” and that “[a]mong the 206 respondents who actually had their 
cars inspected under the new program, 52 percent said they were ‘very satisfied’ with the 
experience”); see also Ostrov, supra note 93, at 142, 190 (observing that “[a]lthough some 
motorists resent the perceived intrusion of the federal bureaucracy into their lives, once 
implemented, I/M need be no more intrusive or costly than the state safety inspections familiar 
to most,” and summarizing polling data showing high public support for the continuation of I/M 
programs in states that had implemented them (footnote omitted)). 
 103. See McGarity, supra note 90, at 1622 (“State officials often express frustration with the 
intrusiveness of federal programs. They resent being treated like junior partners in the 
relationship, and they react negatively to the threat of federal sanctions, even when those 
sanctions are merely refusals to provide federal dollars to fund state programs.”). 
 104. See John Quarles, The Transportation Control Plans—Federal Regulation’s Collision 
with Reality, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 252–53 (1977) (reviewing cases that constrained 
EPA’s authority to require specific regulatory actions by states under the CAA).  
 105. See McGarity, supra note 90, at 1621 (observing that some states doubt that the health 
threats posed by air pollutants that I/M programs aim to reduce actually pose health threats 
serious enough “to require members of the general public to go out of their way to clean up 
pollution”). 
 106. Id. at 1623–24; see also Harris, supra note 96, at 1317 (“There are several underlying 
reasons for the seemingly widespread aversion to the I/M program. They are: 1) an antipathy to 
federal intrusion in matters considered to be of ‘state or local’ concern; 2) a concern about the 
costs attending such programs; and 3) a belief in the existing technological effectiveness and 
efficiency of most American and foreign made automobiles.”). A similar account helps to 
explain the EPA’s inability to impose transportation controls under the Clean Air Amendments 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 
(2006)). See Quarles, supra note 104, at 249–55. The EPA attempted, and failed, to require 
KUH IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  3:58 PM 
1140 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1111 
of this troubled history, I/M programs have now been implemented in 
over thirty states, and their requirements are accepted as business as 
usual for millions of individuals.107 In Professor Eric Biber’s words, 
“[A]s drivers adapted to the existence of I/M programs, they became 
much less controversial and much more popular.”108 
2. Clean Water Act.  The Clean Water Act (CWA), although 
initially and primarily oriented toward larger point sources of 
pollution,109 also directly regulates individual behaviors in a few ways. 
Most notably, individual property owners may be subject to controls 
on the use of their property that are designed to protect wetlands.110 
 
transportation controls designed to reduce automobile use. Proposed measures included 
programs designed to disincentivize individuals from using their cars, including higher fees for 
parking, reduced parking availability, and gas rationing. Id. at 245–46. The transportation-
control plans occasioned significant public outcry, which ultimately helped to defeat the plans, 
id. at 249–50, but a variety of other factors—including many of the federalism tensions that 
plagued the implementation of I/M programs—also contributed to their failure, id. at 250–58. 
 107. For a description of current I/M programs, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MAJOR 
ELEMENTS OF OPERATING I/M PROGRAMS (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/epg/
420b03012.pdf. See generally Benjamin Soskis, Lone Star Joining, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 
2000, at 23, 26 (reporting on the results of polling showing that “[i]n 1999, 70 percent of 
those . . . polled supported emissions testing for all vehicles in Houston, up from 38 percent just 
four years earlier”).  
 108. Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1325 n.84 
(2009).  
 109. The core provisions of the CWA regulate the addition of pollutants to navigable waters 
from point sources. Point sources are defined in the Act as “any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, 
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or 
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Clean Water Act (CWA) 
§ 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). Individuals have been deemed not to be point sources. 
United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993).  
 110. Individual property owners may also be required to control runoff from their property 
when a water body does not meet state water-quality standards and total maximum daily loads 
have been developed. CWA § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). Individual behaviors, such as 
washing a car, may also be regulated under provisions of the Act governing stormwater 
discharges. See generally id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (“Permits for discharges from municipal 
storm sewers . . . shall include a requirement to effectively prohibit non-stormwater discharges 
into the storm sewers . . . .”). Efforts to restrict non-storm-water discharges to storm sewers 
include restrictions on car washing and other individual activities. For example, the website of 
the City of South Portland, Maine, provides guidance about permissible types of outdoor car 
washing. Outdoor Car Washing, CITY OF S. PORTLAND, http://www.southportland.org/index
.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7B845FE76B-380A-4630-97BC-F7F9D81A9040%7D&DE=%
7BA673B004-F980-4A83-80E5-616BE61D56E9%7D (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (“Regardless of 
the type of outside washing activity occurring, wash water is prohibited from directly entering 
surface waters (ponds, streams or wetlands), drainage ditches, storm drains or dry wells. . . . The 
use of acids, bases, metal brighteners, degreasing agents is prohibited for outside washing 
activities that do not discharge to a [publicly owned treatment works].”).  
KUH IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  3:58 PM 
2012] WHEN GOVERNMENT INTRUDES 1141 
Section 404 of the CWA prohibits the dredging or filling of wetlands 
that fall within the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction if a given 
individual lacks a permit.111 Obtaining an individual section 404 
permit can be a lengthy, complex, costly, and uncertain process.112 
Permits may not be available, for example, if there is a “practicable 
alternative” to the proposed discharge that would not have the same 
adverse impact on wetlands113 or if issuing the permit would cause any 
of a number of specified effects, including contributing to “significant 
degradation of the waters of the United States.”114 Thus, property 
owners who have long imagined building a swimming pool and 
gazebo in their backyard, or perhaps a cabin on the family’s lakefront 
property, may discover that doing so will require them to submit to a 
potentially complex federal permitting process,115 to alter their plans 
to minimize impacts on wetlands, or perhaps even to abandon their 
plans altogether if a permit is not authorized. If they fail to recognize 
or heed the statute’s requirement and instead proceed without a 
permit, they may be subject to civil and criminal penalties.116 
Section 404’s potential and actual interference with property 
rights has occasioned vociferous opposition to the program.117 
Property owners have challenged section 404 restrictions as 
 
 111. CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
 112. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (“The average applicant for an 
individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average 
applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation 
or design changes.”). Notably, however, many common dredge and fill activities with minor 
impacts—for example, projects that fill half an acre or less of nontidal wetlands—may be 
authorized under nationwide general permits, which are much more readily obtained than 
individual permits. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 834–35 (2d 
ed. 2008). And some evidence suggests that the permit process is becoming more customer 
friendly and easier to navigate. See Kim Diana Connolly, Survey Says: Army Corps No Scalian 
Despot, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,317, 10,325–33 (2007) (reviewing customer-service surveys 
completed by section 404 applicants). 
 113. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2011).  
 114. See id. § 230.10(b)–(c) (specifying circumstances in which a permit will not be granted). 
 115. Although states can be delegated the authority to implement the section 404 permitting 
program, only two states have accepted this authority. THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 98 
(Mark A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003). States have offered a variety of rationales for the decision not 
to accept permitting authority, including “the controversial nature of section 404 permitting.” 
CRAIG, supra note 112, at 818. 
 116. CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. 
 117. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30423, WETLANDS REGULATION 
AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS “TAKINGS” (2000) (“Talk about wetlands preservation 
today and you may soon be talking about private property and takings. . . . Accounts of land 
owners aggrieved by wetlands regulation have been widely circulated by the property rights 
movement, and challenged by environmentalists.”). 
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unconstitutional takings—though usually unsuccessfully.118 Since 1985, 
the Supreme Court has thrice heard challenges brought by 
landowners contending that they should not be required to obtain a 
section 404 permit to develop their property, on the ground that their 
property did not fall within the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction over 
navigable waters.119 A variety of legislative proposals have been 
offered to limit the reach of the section 404 permitting program.120 
Policy and advocacy groups continue to object to the constraints that 
the section 404 permitting program places on landowners.121 And 
scholars lament the perverse incentives created by uncompensated 
environmental-land-use regulations.122 Professor Jonathan Adler 
observes, for example, that “[f]ederal wetlands regulations under 
section 404 of the CWA . . . likely discourage wetland conservation 
and restoration on private land, and may even encourage land 
modifications that can destroy wetland characteristics.”123 
Nevertheless, the section 404 permitting program chugs along. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers receives roughly 85,000 permit 
requests annually,124 and congressional proposals to limit the reach of 
the section 404 program compete with congressional proposals to 
expand its jurisdiction.125 Moreover, corps customer-service surveys 
reveal little animosity or opposition from individuals who have 
actually applied for a section 404 permit.126 Notably, opposition to the 
 
 118. Id. (reviewing wetlands takings cases). 
 119. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 
(1985).  
 120. MELTZ, supra note 117 (“In Congress, the ‘property rights issue’ has played out with 
particular force in the area of wetlands regulation. Many property rights bills have targeted 
wetlands regulation.”).  
 121. See, e.g., DANIEL R. SIMMONS & H. STERLING BURNETT, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY 
ANALYSIS, POLICY REPORT NO. 291, PROTECTING PROPERTY RIGHTS, PRESERVING 
FEDERALISM AND SAVING WETLANDS (2006) (critiquing the section 404 permit program, in 
large measure because of its interference with property rights, and detailing examples of abusive 
application of the program to individual property owners). 
 122. Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of 
Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 313–19 (2008). 
 123. Id. at 313–14. 
 124. JEFFREY A. ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB97014, 
WETLANDS ISSUES 5 (2003).  
 125. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41594, WATER QUALITY ISSUES IN 
THE 112TH CONGRESS: OVERSIGHT AND IMPLEMENTATION 12 (2011). 
 126. See Connolly, supra note 112, at 10,325–33 (reviewing customer-service surveys 
completed by section 404 applicants and finding that “[i]n those districts that reported with a 
statistically significant number of surveys, more than half of respondents evaluating their overall 
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section 404 program appears centered on the program’s 
uncompensated and, in the eyes of some, unfair restrictions on 
property use. Under this account, the section 404 program is unfair 
because “[t]he benefits of wetlands preservation . . .—water filtration, 
wildlife habitat, protection against flooding and erosion—inure to the 
public. By contrast, the burdens of wetlands preservation, in terms of 
development denied, fall on the wetland owner.”127 These property-
rights objections, premised largely on questions of fairness, arise out 
of controls on uses of property, as opposed to direct controls on 
individual behaviors. As such, they generate an objection distinct 
from the intrusion objection, which is frequently characterized as 
arising from a rejection of government invasion of privacy.128 Finally, 
at least some resistance to the section 404 program can likely be 
ascribed to the fact that the program is frequently enforced by the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—a federal agency regulating in an 
area traditionally left to local governments.129 
3. Endangered Species Act.  A core protection of the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (ESA)130 is its prohibition on the “taking” of 
listed endangered species.131 The term “take” is defined by statute to 
mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect.”132 The statutory term “harm” has been further defined by 
regulation to mean an act that actually kills or injures wildlife, a 
definition that may “include significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly 
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
 
experience with the Corps’ Regulatory Program gave ‘high satisfaction’ ratings” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 127. MELTZ, supra note 117. 
 128. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 123 (“Efforts to detect and ultimately enforce against 
individual activities that usually occur at home or in the immediately surrounding area would 
trigger enormous political resistance, as they would be seen as an interference with individual 
liberty and an invasion of privacy.”). 
 129. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006) (discussing the 
states’ traditional authority over land-use decisions). 
 130. See Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010). 
 131. Id. § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). The Act also prohibits the removal or 
damage of endangered plants in known violation of state law, id. § 9(a)(2)(B), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1538(a)(2)(B), and the take prohibition sometimes extends to threatened species as well, 50 
C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2010). 
 132. ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
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sheltering.”133 The ESA also prohibits the sale, import, export, or 
transport of listed endangered species.134 Violation of these provisions 
may lead to civil and criminal penalties, and the ESA provides a 
mechanism for prospectively enjoining activities that might have 
these forbidden effects.135 
The ESA thus regulates individuals in two related but distinct 
ways. First, it prohibits individuals from directly killing, injuring, et 
cetera—or selling, transporting, et cetera—listed endangered species. 
Second, because significant habitat modification can also constitute a 
“take,”136 the ESA regulates individuals as property owners, 
effectively restricting their use of their property. Even when a 
landowner does not know whether modifying the habitat on his 
property will harm a protected species, he nonetheless faces a 
potentially difficult decision, as explained by Steven Quarles and 
Thomas Lundquist: 
[W]here there is . . . a risk of future take, it appears that the 
landowner is free to make a difficult choice among the options of: 
(1) not conducting the land use activity and bearing the economic 
consequences; (2) applying for an incidental take permit and bearing 
the economic, delay, and permit uncertainty consequences; or 
(3) conducting the land use activity and bearing the consequences of 
potential civil and criminal liability if a take does occur.137 
The first set of restrictions—on an individual’s freedom to 
directly kill or injure; or to sell, import, export, or transport 
endangered species—has not engendered widespread or sustained 
public objection and appears to be relatively well accepted.138 The 
 
 133. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. Of note, however, the showing required to establish a take remains 
unclear and differs among jurisdictions. Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do 
Land Use Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 207, 207–09 (Donald C. Baur 
& Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002).  
 134. ESA § 9(a)(1)(A), (E)–(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A), (E)–(F).  
 135. Id. § 11(a)–(b), (e)(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)–(b), (e)(6).  
 136. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) 
(holding that habitat modification can constitute an illegal “take” of a species). 
 137. Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 133, at 233–34; see also id. at 242–43 (“[L]andowners 
in areas inhabited by listed wildlife species face uncertainty as to whether their land use actions 
will be viewed as take. This springs from both factual uncertainty about whether the land use 
activity will actually injure a member of a listed wildlife species and legal uncertainty over the 
applicable tests for harm and harass.”). 
 138. This statement should not be taken to suggest that no opposition to these ESA 
restrictions exists. Landowners, for example, have protested that the Act’s take prohibition 
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second set of restrictions—on land use—however, has inspired 
strident and sustained public objections.139 These restrictions are 
criticized as unfairly imposing the costs of species protection on a 
subset of individual landowners;140 subjecting individuals to a 
confusing array of regulatory requirements and red tape; usurping 
local land-use authority; creating perverse incentives that cause 
landowners to harm species and destroy habitats to avoid 
regulation;141 and, most importantly, interfering with landowners’ 
property rights.142 Thus, as with the section 404 program, opposition to 
the ESA’s land-use restrictions centers on their interference with 
property rights.143 The regulatory interpretation of the term “take” to 
 
unfairly prevents them from protecting their property, including livestock, from nuisance 
predator species, such as grizzly bears and wolves. See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things 
Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 391–98 (1994) 
(describing property claims that arise from “instances when a person is barred from using 
certain measures to protect his property from the depredations of protected wild animals”). This 
source of opposition is, however, more akin to objections grounded in concerns over property 
rights. 
 139. See, e.g., Erin Morrow, The Environmental Front: Cultural Warfare in the West, 25 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 183, 184 (2005) (commenting that “[t]he broad regulatory 
powers and land use restrictions wielded by federal agents under the Endangered Species 
Act . . . have collided with western perceptions of private property and distrust of regulation,” 
and describing the “legal and cultural battles” that were occasioned by implementation of the 
ESA in the American West).  
 140. Id. at 188 (“The ESA has been criticized by landowners, environmentalists, and 
economists alike because it unfairly allocates costs and creates perverse incentives. The ESA is 
justified because it provides collective benefits like potential medical discoveries, aesthetic 
pleasure, and ecosystem functions. The cost of species protection, however, falls on a much 
narrower subgroup.”); see also Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying the 
majority’s opinion as “impos[ing] unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the 
rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use”). 
 141. Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the 
Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826–28 (1997) (describing the public 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision that significant habitat modification can constitute a 
prohibited take of a species, including the recommendation of the executive director of the 
American Lands Rights Association that property owners should shoot and bury endangered 
species spotted on their land to avoid the Act’s strictures). 
 142. See id. at 831–51 (describing property-rights objections to the ESA); Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 305, 324–335 (1997) (explaining the property-rights movement’s objections to, and focus 
on, the ESA). 
 143. Doremus, supra note 29, at 346 (“Despite an under-appreciated history of substantial 
regulation, real property has somehow become an iconic symbol of individual liberty in 
America. Landowners assume that they are or should be free to use their land in virtually any 
way they please, so long as other people are not directly injured by that use. Because that 
assumption is widespread and politically powerful, the effort to impose the kinds of regulatory 
controls on land use that are essential to biodiversity protection faces particularly formidable 
institutional barriers.” (footnote omitted)). 
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include significant habitat modification has been legally challenged, 
although ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court.144 Opponents of 
the ESA have also brought suit alleging that the statute is 
unconstitutional, most notably arguing that application of the ESA to 
intrastate species and property exceeds Congress’s authority under 
the Commerce Clause.145 Aggrieved property owners have continued 
to argue—overwhelmingly unsuccessfully—that ESA-imposed 
restrictions on land use constitute a compensable taking.146 Scholars 
have critiqued the perverse incentives that the ESA creates for 
landowners to kill endangered species, remove evidence of the 
animals’ presence, and destroy potential habitats; stories of this kind 
of landowner behavior, colloquially termed “shoot, shovel and shut 
up,” abound.147 In response to this widespread derision, Congress 
amended the ESA to allow individuals to apply for permits to “take” 
species in certain circumstances, thereby blunting the statute’s 
restrictions on property use.148 Congress has also entertained many 
proposals aimed at amending the ESA to limit or remove restrictions 
on private landowners or to provide them with compensation.149 
For present purposes, what is perhaps most notable about these 
ESA controversies is that they are not grounded in the narrower, 
privacy-based intrusion objection. And even if the public opposition 
 
 144. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708. 
 145. See, e.g., GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding the take prohibition as applied to intrastate species on intrastate property in Texas); 
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 486–87 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding application of the section 9 
take prohibition to an experimental population of red wolves in North Carolina and Tennessee); 
Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059–60 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding 
application of section 9 of the ESA to a wholly intrastate species on a wholly intrastate 
property). 
 146. Glenn P. Sugameli, The ESA and Takings of Private Property, in ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT, supra note 133, at 441, 441–58. 
 147. See Adler, supra note 122, at 319–32 (advocating the compensation of landowners, in 
part because it would remove harmful perverse incentives and thus would benefit species, and 
detailing how the ESA causes landowners to undermine species-preservation efforts); see also 
Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 824–28 (2002) 
(documenting the ubiquity of claims that landowners destroy habitats to avoid the ESA’s 
strictures but finding no empirical evidence to support the view that the attitudes motivating 
such behavior actually render the Act ineffective). 
 148. Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2006); see also 
Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 133, at 243–44 (describing efforts to provide landowners with 
greater certainty regarding compliance with the ESA). 
 149. E.g., Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (creating a system of grants for private landowners who protect endangered 
species and authorizing reimbursements for private livestock killed by endangered predatory 
species). 
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to the ESA could be understood to fall within the very broad 
conception of the intrusion objection as political resistance to 
government overreaching, the very specific context for that 
opposition, as with opposition to the section 404 program, would be 
the somewhat unique setting of property rights.150 
C. Lessons from Regulation of Environmentally Significant 
Individual Behaviors 
The difficulties encountered in applying federal environmental 
statutes directly to individuals are often cited—even by this author—
as evidence of the perils of using mandates to control environmentally 
significant individual behaviors and, thus, of the limited utility of 
those mandates.151 To some extent, the examples in the previous 
Sections map onto the standard critique of individual mandates, 
which focuses on cost and administrative constraints, as well as public 
opposition to “intrusive” enforcement.152 Implementation burdens—
the cost and administrative burden of testing emissions from 
hundreds of thousands of vehicles153—appear to explain, at least in 
part, the difficulties encountered with respect to the CAA I/M 
programs, specifically, states’ resistance to implementing those 
programs.154 It is also clear, however, that other factors, beyond 
implementation challenges and public opposition, have contributed to 
the difficulties encountered in implementing the regulatory measures. 
Federalism friction, in terms of states’ willingness to implement 
federal statutes through cooperative-federalism arrangements, has 
 
 150. Perceptions of interference with property rights may present special considerations. See 
generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
449, 451–52 (2010) (using the ESA as an example of a circumstance in which property owners’ 
mistaken perceptions of strong or unfettered private property rights can frustrate regulation and 
proposing new methods for framing property rights to avoid this problem). 
 151. See Katrina Fischer Kuh, Using Local Knowledge To Shrink the Individual Carbon 
Footprint, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 936 (2009) (“[M]andates and their enforcement—even if 
feasible—may founder on objections that they are uncomfortably intrusive. . . . And mandates 
on individual action that raise such objections create the risk of giving rise to perverse 
responses.”); Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 554–56 (“Efforts to control individual behavior [for 
environmental reasons] through command and control regulation have been far more limited 
and far less successful.”). 
 152. Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 597–600 (describing the difficulties of applying mandates 
to individual behaviors, including the cost and intrusiveness of enforcement). 
 153. McGarity, supra note 90, at 1571 (referencing an EPA estimate that the cost of testing 
to implement one proposed I/M rule would have been approximately $451 million). 
 154. Reitze & Needleman, supra note 93, at 416 (explaining that the I/M program was 
“unpopular in many states” partly because it “drained scarce state financial resources”). 
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bedeviled the CAA’s vehicle I/M program.155 And, as discussed in 
Part I.B.1, the public has opposed these measures for a variety of 
reasons separate from any objections to the intrusiveness of 
government enforcement. 
Perhaps most interesting are the ways in which prior experience 
regulating environmentally significant individual behaviors departs 
from, or at least complicates, the intrusion objection. Although 
nowhere fully developed or explained, the intrusion objection is 
frequently articulated as the idea that direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors would require 
unacceptably intrusive enforcement—measures that would be too 
invasive of privacy and civil liberties156 or, as the intrusion objection is 
occasionally characterized, that would constitute government 
overreaching.157 This objection suggests that a government “no fly” 
zone exists, in which regulation of individuals is per se unacceptable. 
It also suggests that direct regulation of environmentally significant 
individual behaviors would be of limited utility because it would so 
frequently transgress that no-fly zone. The American experience with 
direct regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors 
complicates this view. 
First, direct regulation of at least some environmentally 
significant individual behaviors is relatively common and is generally 
accepted, primarily at the local level. This acceptance is present even 
when enforcement, or at least the threat of enforcement, is arguably 
quite intrusive—for example, when recycling ordinances permit 
searches of individuals’ trash.158 Notably, the restrictions on the export 
or sale of endangered species have similarly not occasioned 
significant backlash. 
Second, public opposition to measures that directly regulate 
environmentally significant individual behaviors does not appear to 
have been monolithic over time in terms of content, breadth, or even 
strength, nor does it appear to have been expressed exclusively or 
even primarily through concerns about government invasion of 
privacy or overreaching. Public opposition has proved to be dynamic 
 
 155. McGarity, supra note 90, at 1622–24 (describing state-federal disputes over the 
implementation of I/M requirements and further observing that politicians have frequently used 
the I/M program to make appeals to the public that “attack[ed] the federal government”). 
 156. See supra note 30. 
 157. See supra note 31. 
 158. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
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over time or geography, a fact that is illustrated by the reality that 
vehicle I/M programs are now commonplace in many parts of the 
country. This example suggests the possibility that even strident initial 
opposition to a measure might reflect a mere bias for the status quo, 
but one that can ultimately be overcome.159 Public opposition 
sometimes appears to have arisen from the straightforward rejection 
of a measure on typical balancing grounds—that is, based on the 
contention that the benefits of the measure are not worth the cost or 
inconvenience.160 And opposition has frequently been grounded in 
property-rights objections that are distinct from the 
enforcement/privacy concerns that are most commonly understood to 
animate the intrusion objection. Property-rights objections are 
frequently rooted in claims about fairness or the undue burden 
imposed on a select number of unlucky landowners, and they 
arguably present a type of objection to regulation that is distinct from 
even the broadest conception of the intrusion objection as being 
premised on public opposition to government overreach.161 Indeed, 
 
 159. See generally Biber, supra note 108, at 1317–28 (noting and offering explanations for 
the “resistance to the regulation of long-standing activities,” including the status quo bias, and 
observing that this resistance may be particularly pronounced when regulation seeks to prevent 
long-term environmental harms); Doremus, supra note 29, at 346 (“The law’s resistance to 
change is even more pronounced when regulation is sought in an area where unrestricted 
individual choice has been (or is perceived to have been) the norm.”); Lisa Heinzerling, 
Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2068 (1999) (discussing the status 
quo bias and how habits and their development can dictate the environmental harms occasioned 
by individual behaviors); Serkin, supra note 46 (exploring and critiquing property law’s robust 
protections for existing uses). 
 160. Consider, for example, public complaints about vehicle I/M programs. See supra notes 
91–93 and accompanying text. 
 161. For a discussion of why and how property-rights objections may present a special case, 
see Doremus, supra note 29, at 346; and Nash & Stern, supra note 150, at 449. In addition to the 
fairness objections noted with respect to land-use restrictions imposed under the section 404 
program and section 9 of the ESA, similar fairness objections sometimes arise in the context of 
objections to water-use restrictions. Although common and generally accepted in many 
communities, water-conservation ordinances often raise fairness issues. Residents of Nassau 
County objected to their ordinance because they believed that restrictions were being instituted 
to allow for overdevelopment and that wealthier neighborhoods were being permitted to use 
more water. Schmitt, supra note 73. In the Tampa Bay area, the South Florida Water 
Management District found in a public-opinion survey that public opposition only seems to 
come into play when residents do not feel that others are doing their part, particularly when the 
agricultural industry does not seem to be helping with conservation. David K. Rogers, ‘Do Your 
Part’ To Save Water, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at 1B; see also Shirley David, 
Letter to the Editor, Strawberry Growers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at 10A 
(blaming agricultural water use for damage to private homes); D.W. Deck, Letter to the Editor, 
Real Cause of Sinkholes Ignored, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at 2 (arguing that 
overuse of water in other counties was having detrimental effects on homeowners who were 
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with the possible exception of commentary suggesting that the use of 
RFID chips to enforce recycling ordinances constitutes government 
spying, not one of the examples in this Part seems to provide a clear 
example of the privacy-based intrusion objection in action. But fatal 
public opposition—for example, to environmental taxes or to the 
installation of smart meters—has arisen with respect to the indirect 
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors as well. 
A review of the regulation of environmentally significant 
individual behaviors suggests that, broadly speaking, indirect 
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors is the 
predominant method. Additionally, although intrusion objections and 
public resistance frustrate some efforts at indirect regulation, the 
intrusion objection has not been held up as a significant impediment 
to the use of indirect regulation generally, as it has been with respect 
to direct regulation.162 Public, political resistance is frequently 
identified as a significant impediment to environmental taxes aimed 
at individuals; notably, however, the origin of that resistance is not 
characterized as a rejection of intrusive government action, nor is the 
political infeasibility of such taxes taken as a wholesale rejection of 
other indirect market measures to influence environmentally 
significant individual behaviors. 
This heavy reliance on the indirect regulation of individuals 
suggests an interesting observation with respect to the intrusion 
objection. Although the intrusion objection posits that direct 
regulation of individuals poses particular concerns regarding the 
infringement of civil liberties, in some ways, indirect regulation is 
arguably more intrusive, or at least more troubling, from the 
 
conserving). In Rio Rancho, New Mexico, residents expressed concern about the water 
demands of new development and industry’s high use of water, particularly the failure of 
industry to do its part to conserve. See Jon Fleischer, Letter to the Editor, Building Isn’t Drying 
Up, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 9, 2006, at A6 (describing the water plan as beneficial only for 
developers); Gary W. Priester, Letter to the Editor, Drought Does Not Compute, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., May 9, 2006, at A6 (objecting specifically to Intel’s water usage). 
 162. This observation should not be read to imply that environmental laws that indirectly 
regulate individuals occasion no public opposition. To the contrary, indirect regulation can and 
does inspire negative public responses, particularly when the indirect regulation is recognized 
as—or simply viewed as—imposing higher costs on individuals. See Anderson, supra note 53, at 
367 n.242 (citing, as an example of public backlash against indirect regulation, water customers’ 
burning their water bills to protest higher costs attributable to the cleanup of Boston Harbor); 
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 13, at 739–40 (describing the defeat of a Maryland proposal to 
install residential smart meters with peak-demand pricing capabilities and explaining how 
“[p]olicies that link new technology uptake to price signals in some cases can generate 
opposition to both”).  
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perspective of protecting civil liberties, than direct regulation.163 This 
hypothesis may hold true for two reasons. First, in some of its most 
common iterations, such as product mandates, indirect regulation 
extinguishes individual choice: the individual does not have the 
option of choosing not to comply.164 Second, because indirect 
regulations are enforced against other entities, such as product 
manufacturers, those regulations are less visible to the ultimately 
regulated individual and, hence, are less subject to democratic 
controls.165 In short, in some circumstances, indirect regulation may 
attract less public opposition in part because it obscures the controls 
it places on individuals. 
Ultimately, however, information gleaned from a review of prior 
and existing direct regulation of environmentally significant 
individual behaviors does not provide a satisfying basis for drawing 
general conclusions about the potential for applying mandates to 
those behaviors, nor does the information enable an estimation of the 
specific obstacles that the intrusion objection may pose to any given 
project. The characterizations of public opposition that I have offered 
were gleaned from a review of newspaper articles, ad hoc surveys, 
and other similar sources, as opposed to contemporary and reliable 
social-science data. Thus, my characterizations are supported by some 
 
 163. Of course, direct regulation through mandates also constrains liberty. See THALER & 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 186 (“Especially when compared with command-and-control 
systems, economic incentives have a strong libertarian element. Liberty is much greater when 
people are told, ‘You can continue your behavior, so long as you pay for the social harm that it 
does’ than when they are told, ‘You must act exactly as the government says.’”). 
 164. See Cheng, supra note 22, at 669 (“Fiat makes compliance a choice, whereas structure 
makes compliance largely automatic. The involuntary nature of structural regulation raises 
objections of excessive government control, reduced liberty, and invasions of privacy.” 
(footnote omitted)); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 
AM. ECON. REV. 365, 367 (1997) (arguing that internalized norms, unlike external laws, deprive 
individuals of the opportunity to weigh obedience to the law and thereby limit freedom). 
 165. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 243–46 (describing a “publicity principle 
[that] bans government from selecting a policy that it would not be able or willing to defend 
publicly to its own citizens” to mitigate this potential concern); Lessig, supra note 10, at 690 
(observing that “indirect modes of regulation” face a “problem of regulatory indirection” 
because they “may allow the government to achieve a regulatory end without suffering political 
cost”). Of course, some indirect regulation—regulation of the market through taxes on 
consumer goods, for example—is highly visible. This visibility means that such measures are 
often rejected by the public, occasioning recourse to less visible means of indirect regulation or 
other regulatory strategies. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 187 (“[I]ncentive-based 
systems [such as GHG taxes] have not always gained political traction—in part, we think, 
because they make the costs of cleaning up the environment transparent. Announcing a new 
fuel efficiency standard sounds misleadingly ‘free,’ whereas imposing a carbon tax sounds 
expensive, even if it is actually a cheaper way of achieving the same goal.”).  
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data, but they are not definitive or empirically defensible. Moreover, 
the dataset is necessarily incomplete. Missing are a potentially great 
number of measures that—perhaps because they were too intrusive—
never crossed the lips of policymakers or flickered out so quickly that 
they left little record. And my examples are hardly exhaustive. My 
analysis focuses primarily on the usual suspects—those instances of 
direct regulation most often cited as evidence that cuts against the 
feasibility of mandates on individuals—and almost certainly misses 
examples of other types of direct regulation, particularly at the local 
level. Recognizing the limited utility of these factual examples for 
analyzing the intrusion objection, Part II seeks to gain insight from a 
more theoretical perspective, stepping outside of the context of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors and employing 
substantive due process doctrine to think more broadly about what 
might render government regulation of individuals unacceptably 
intrusive. 
II.  RECOGNIZING INTRUSION: LESSONS FROM  
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Governments regularly adopt and enforce laws that directly and 
indirectly restrict individual liberty166 without encountering 
insurmountable public opposition, whether as a result of perceived 
intrusion or otherwise. Speed limits, noise ordinances, compulsory 
education, building codes, product mandates, and criminal codes all 
limit individual freedom. Thus, when the literature raises intrusion 
concerns as a particular impediment to mandates addressed to 
regulating environmentally significant individual behaviors,167 it by 
extension suggests that mandates aimed at these behaviors restrict 
individual freedom in a manner that is more likely to be deemed 
unacceptably intrusive. To better understand what renders such 
mandates particularly offensive—or to better evaluate the claim that 
they are particularly offensive—it is useful to consider a question that 
is both more general and more limited. Namely, when and why are 
 
 166. Or, if one prefers to avoid constitutional connotations, the term “freedom” might be 
preferable. For an interesting dispute over the terminology of liberty versus that of freedom, 
compare City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 n.19 (1999), with id. at 73, 84 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). I generally use the term “liberty” in its broad sense to refer to the “ability of 
individuals to engage in freedom of action within society and free choice regarding most aspects 
of . . . private life.” JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 13.4(d)(vii), at 669 (8th ed. 2010). 
 167. E.g., Babcock, Global Climate Change, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
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government restrictions on individual freedom deemed 
unconstitutional because they are unacceptably intrusive? 
This Part begins by explaining why substantive due process 
doctrine and, in particular, some early privacy cases provide useful 
guidance about when laws are likely to trigger intrusion objections.168 
It then describes how and why those cases distinguish direct and 
indirect regulation and afford special solicitude to conduct occurring 
within the home. This Part further explains why the direct-indirect 
distinction and the special status of the home may offer some insights 
into the intrusion objection. 
A. The Relevance of Substantive Due Process and the Early Privacy 
Cases 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the government 
from depriving persons “of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”169 Under the theory of substantive due process, a law 
contravenes this constitutional guarantee if it does not bear a rational 
relationship to a legitimate interest of government170—in other words, 
if it effects a “totally arbitrary deprivation of liberty”171—or if it 
infringes a fundamental right and is not narrowly tailored to promote 
a compelling government interest.172 The judiciary retains a limited 
power to strike down laws that survive the political process, and that 
do not contravene a right specifically protected in the Bill of Rights, 
but that nonetheless are wholly arbitrary or infringe “fundamental 
 
 168. That this analysis looks to substantive due process review for insight into the intrusion 
objection should not be taken to suggest that that branch of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
is the only—or even the best—source of such insight. Other fields, such as psychology, 
sociology, or political theory; methods, such as polling; or even strands of legal doctrine, such as 
the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, might well provide additional insight. The claim offered here is 
that substantive due process review is one noteworthy source of insight into the intrusion 
objection because the inquiry conducted by judges engaged in this kind of review mirrors the 
core sentiment underlying the intrusion objection: Looking to tradition, history, and gestalt 
notions of freedom and autonomy, has the government overstepped its bounds? Substantive 
due process review may even offer some advantages to, for example, polling because judges 
(unlike polled subjects) are required to explain their decisions. And although substantive due 
process review pulls from both Fourth and Fifth Amendment concepts, it is not tied to the 
interpretation of specific constitutional text. 
 169. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 170. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997); Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 143 
P.3d 571, 576–78 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (explaining when substantive due process claims are 
afforded rational basis review, as opposed to strict scrutiny review). 
 171. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, § 11.4(e), at 486. 
 172. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. 
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rights and liberty interests.”173 Political-process checks and judicial 
review under specific provisions of the Constitution are otherwise 
deemed sufficient to weed out legislation that inflicts unacceptable 
deprivations of liberty. 
This judicial role is both disputed174 and narrowly defined, 
particularly with respect to the application of heightened scrutiny. 
Limitations on the judicial role arise out of the concern that the 
judiciary either lacks institutional competence or acts at the bounds 
of—or even beyond—its constitutional authority when it undertakes 
the necessarily subjective175 task of identifying fundamental rights. As 
the Court itself has explained, 
[W]e “ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended.” By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right 
or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the 
arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore 
“exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new 
ground in this field,” lest the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the 
Members of this Court.176 
A chief doctrinal constraint on substantive due process review is that 
heightened scrutiny is meant to be reserved for the most important 
and historically demonstrable177 rights and liberties—those that are 
 
 173. Id. at 720. At best, substantive due process review provides a judicial backstop to 
prevent liberty deprivations that are out of step with the shared American understanding of the 
appropriate role of government but that have slipped through the political process; at worst, in 
the name of erecting such a backstop, courts impose artificial and unnecessary constraints on 
government power that are out of sync with public and constitutional values. 
 174. For a recent demonstration of disagreements over the meaning and scope of the Due 
Process Clause, compare the concurrence of Justice Scalia in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 
S. Ct. 3020, 3050–58 (2010), with the dissent of Justice Stevens, id. at 3088–3120 (Stevens, J. 
dissenting). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (examining theories about the proper judicial role); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) 
(referring to substantive due process as a “contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel 
redness’”). 
 175. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (referring to the “subjective elements that are necessarily 
present in due process judicial review”). 
 176. Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).  
 177. Id. at 721.  
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“rooted in the . . . conscience of our people”178 and that constitute 
“vital principles in our free Republican governments” that 
“determine the nature and terms of the social compact.”179 
The narrow role reserved to the judiciary in substantive due 
process review reflects in part the belief that judicial intervention is 
often unnecessary, as the political process will frequently defeat 
offensive measures; the intrusion objection can be understood to 
function as part of that political-process check: laws restricting 
environmentally significant individual behaviors that trigger intrusion 
objections will not be enacted, will be repealed, or will be willfully 
disregarded and unenforced. Of course, the public may reject 
perfectly constitutional restrictions for a variety of reasons unrelated 
to concerns about intrusion. For instance, the public might not accept 
that the environmental problem is real or important, or at least not 
important enough to warrant a particular government action, or 
individuals might not wish to be personally subject to the restriction.180 
Thus, public and political tolerance of liberty deprivations to protect 
the environment does not necessarily have a constitutional dimension 
and may, in many cases, be indexed to considerations unrelated to 
intrusion objections.181 Moreover, although one can imagine, say, a 
 
 178. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
 179. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted). 
 180. As I have explained, the intrusion objection is nowhere precisely defined. It is most 
commonly described as an objection grounded in concerns about how government enforcement 
might infringe civil liberties, most notably privacy. Substantive due process review may be most 
relevant in terms of illuminating this narrower, privacy-based type of intrusion objection. At 
times, the intrusion objection is described more broadly as public—or political—resistance to 
measures designed to restrict environmentally significant individual behaviors. To the extent 
that this resistance resides in straightforward balancing (in other words, a measure generates 
opposition because the public is not convinced that its purpose or effect warrants its costs, or 
simply because members of the public—recognizing the government has the authority to impose 
the proposed constraints—nonetheless do not wish to be subject to those constraints), 
substantive due process review will shed little light. To the extent, however, that this resistance 
is grounded in a sense that government has overreached—exceeded its appropriate bounds with 
respect to its dictate of individual decisions—or that the perceived intrusiveness of a measure is 
one of the costs weighed by the public in deciding whether to support that measure, substantive 
due process review may well provide some insight. 
 181. It is unclear whether the intrusion objection anticipates that most mandates governing 
environmentally significant individual behaviors will be rejected on intrusiveness grounds 
regardless of the value placed on the environmental benefit sought to be achieved, or whether 
the intrusion objection functions simply to outweigh environmental benefits, as when individuals 
conclude that the environmental benefits of a measure do not justify the discomfort of the 
intrusion required to achieve its benefits. This latter analysis is akin to the balancing undertaken 
by the Court during the Lochner era, which has since been disavowed, whereby the Justices 
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population-control measure that might offend fundamental rights,182 
the vast majority of measures that might be contemplated as a means 
of altering environmentally significant behaviors—requiring 
individuals to reduce the settings of their water heaters or keep their 
tires properly inflated183—do not implicate fundamental rights subject 
to heightened due process review.184 
Substantive due process review does, however, perform the same 
basic function as the intrusion objection: it imposes boundaries on 
government restrictions of individual liberty.185 Importantly, both 
substantive due process review186 and public or political rejection of a 
measure on intrusion grounds can forestall government action, even 
when the action has a legitimate, rational purpose, if the action is 
deemed to intrude too greatly on individual liberty. Both processes 
demarcate the proper relationship between government and the 
individual—in effect, what the government either cannot do or should 
 
would “only approve laws where they believe[d] that the end of the law, based on their personal 
values, justifie[d] an intrusion on individual liberty.” NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, 
§ 11.4(e), at 489. In either case, the obstacle that the intrusion objection poses to the use of 
mandates on environmentally significant individual behaviors depends on when, how, and to 
what extent mandates trigger the intrusion objection. 
 182. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 n.3 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] state interest in population control could not 
justify a state-imposed limit on family size or, for that matter, state-mandated abortions.”). 
 183. By one estimate, a “one-third increase in proper tire inflation would translate into CO2 
savings of 12 million tons,” and a reduction in the temperature of a water heater from 140 or 150 
degrees Fahrenheit to 120 degrees Fahrenheit “could produce as much as 1,466 pounds of CO2 
emissions reductions per year.” Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions, supra note 
12, at 1746, 1748.  
 184. Recognized fundamental rights include “the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights” as well as “the rights to marry; to have children; to direct the education and upbringing 
of one’s children; to marital privacy; to use contraception; to bodily integrity; and to abortion.” 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 185. Notably, substantive due process review also employs the terminology of intrusion to 
characterize government action that oversteps. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) 
(holding that a state statute prohibiting same-sex sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it “further[ed] no legitimate state interest which c[ould] 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 186. Strict scrutiny is applied to government actions that infringe on fundamental rights. See 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (observing that substantive due process “forbids the 
government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is 
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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not do based on the “nature and terms of the social compact.”187 And 
in imposing boundaries on government action, both processes locate 
the boundaries—self-consciously, in the case of substantive due 
process review; intuitively, in the case of the intrusion objection—in 
accordance with gestalt notions of “the [appropriate] balance 
[between the] . . . liberty of the individual . . . and the demands of 
organized society.”188 So, under substantive due process review, 
boundaries on government action are adduced by looking to “our 
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices”189 for “enduring 
themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages.”190 In the 
context of the intrusion objection, boundaries are imposed when an 
environmental mandate gives rise to what the public—whose 
attitudes are presumably shaped by this same history and tradition—
views as “an interference with individual liberty and an invasion of 
privacy”191 that is unacceptably intrusive. 
Substantive due process analysis is, then, self-consciously 
grounded in values and tradition, both of which arise from and reflect 
ingrained societal understandings about when the government has 
overstepped its bounds.192 Justice Black’s dissent in Griswold v. 
Connecticut193 went so far as to suggest that polling the public would 
 
 187. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted). 
 188. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 189. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710. 
 190. Id. at 711.  
 191. Babcock, supra note 4, at 123. 
 192. This statement is not to suggest that judicial and lay understandings of when 
government has overstepped are, in fact or in theory, precisely the same. That judicial review is 
needed at all indicates that the political process will not always weed out unconstitutional 
deprivations of liberty. But such deprivations might occur even when judicial and lay 
understandings of government intrusion concur. Liberty-depriving laws may be enacted because 
of flaws in the political process—such that the political process fails to reflect public liberty 
values—or may be recognized as liberty-depriving but aimed at minority groups. Indeed, these 
rationales are frequently referenced to justify judicial review. See United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (recognizing that judicial review has been used to 
correct flawed political processes). For example, one explanation offered of the privacy cases is 
that the Court was concerned with desuetude and that the privacy cases signify “a judicial 
insistence that, if laws cannot be enforced directly—through the criminal law prohibiting certain 
activities—they cannot be enforced through indirect, sporadic, discriminatory routes that escape 
the same degree of public accountability.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 842 
(6th ed. 2009). So, in other words, a law may be unacceptably intrusive to the public, but 
because opportunities for public resistance have been limited, court policing of that boundary is 
necessary. 
 193. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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prove a more reliable method of identifying fundamental rights than 
judicial review, which inevitably hews instead to the “personal and 
private notions”194 of judges: “Our Court certainly has no machinery 
with which to take a Gallup Poll. And the scientific miracles of this 
age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to 
determine what traditions are rooted in the ‘[collective] conscience of 
our people.’”195 In a 2010 dissent, Justice Stevens insisted that “[a]ll 
Americans can [and that] all Americans should” interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that “courts should be ‘guided by what 
the American people throughout our history have thought’” in 
identifying fundamental rights.196 The Court’s explanation of the need 
for substantive due process review in Meyer v. Nebraska197 similarly 
underscored the connection between judicial and lay attitudes about 
the appropriate sphere of government conduct. The Court recounted 
that Plato had endorsed, and Sparta in fact had practiced, the removal 
of children from the care of their parents to be raised by “official 
guardians.”198 The Court then capitalized on the presumed 
repugnance of this practice to explain that 
[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men 
of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual 
and State were wholly different from those upon which our 
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature 
could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without 
doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.199 
The Court’s rhetorical mechanism—providing an example designed 
to inspire a gut reaction against government overstepping—nicely 
captures the connection between the public response to laws that 
constrain liberty and substantive due process review, which purports 
 
 194. Id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 195. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring)). That substantive due process review has long permitted the Court to “actively 
enforce values which a majority of the Justices felt were essential in our society even though 
they had no specific textual basis in the Constitution,” and thereby effectively to substitute the 
Justices’ judgment for that of the legislature and the public, persists as a chief criticism of 
substantive due process review. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 166, § 11.7, at 498.  
 196. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3099 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting id. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 197. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (striking down a law prohibiting the 
teaching of languages other than English).  
 198. Id. at 402. 
 199. Id.  
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to draw heavily upon widely held and accepted understandings of the 
limits on government restrictions of individual liberty. 
Finally, substantive due process review does not identify 
fundamental rights in a vacuum.200 It requires that they be carefully 
described and defined in relation to a challenged government 
action.201 That an area is identified as one involving a fundamental 
right does not preclude, or even subject to heightened scrutiny, any 
government action touching on that subject; government action must 
satisfy heightened scrutiny only when a fundamental right has been 
infringed.202 Both the contours of the right itself and the judicial 
review afforded in a particular case are indexed to the nature of the 
government action.203 In other words, the Court evaluates not only the 
subject matter—procreation, children, marriage—but also the specific 
means of government action—direct and total prohibition or 
incidental effect—to ascertain the existence of a fundamental right 
and to determine whether that right has been infringed.204 Thus, 
substantive due process review provides guidance about how the 
manner and method of government action can affect the level of 
perceived or actual constraint on individual freedom even when, as 
with respect to environmentally significant individual behaviors, 
fundamental rights or freedoms are not necessarily implicated. 
Public reactions to a proposed law’s constraints on liberty, as 
well as the judicial analysis underlying substantive due process, are 
thus grounded in murky instincts about the proper “relation between 
individual and State.”205 Additionally, substantive due process review 
provides lessons not only about the subject matter and types of 
liberties worthy of special protection but also about the means of 
government action that are generally most suspect in terms of 
infringing on liberties. For these reasons, explanations offered as part 
 
 200. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3102 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that liberty claims are 
not evaluated “on an abstract plane”). 
 201. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
 202. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–75 (1992) (applying an 
“undue burden” test and observing that the Court’s “jurisprudence relating to all 
liberties . . . has recognized [that] not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, 
ipso facto, an infringement of that right”).  
 203. Id. 
 204. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 161, § 11.5, at 490–91 (“[A] determination that a 
regulated activity comes within the constitutional definition of liberty does not determine the 
manner in which the Court will review restrictions on that activity. Only significant impairments 
of fundamental constitutional rights will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny . . . .”). 
 205. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). 
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of a substantive due process review as to when, how, and why 
government action has infringed upon “deeply rooted”206 fundamental 
rights and liberties—in particular those grounded in privacy 
interests—can shed light on when, how, and why a law might meet 
public and political resistance because of a perception that it is unduly 
intrusive. 
A review of a subset of substantive due process cases—those 
leading to the recognition of a fundamental right to privacy—reveals 
that the individual behaviors targeted, the policy tool chosen to 
change those behaviors, and the requirements of enforcement all help 
define the perceived intrusiveness of government action. Two 
principles can be gleaned from these cases, both of which help to 
illuminate the intrusion objection in the context of individual 
environmental mandates. First, direct mandates on individuals may 
be understood to impose greater and more troublesome liberty 
deprivations than laws that constrain the same individual behaviors 
indirectly through, for example, product mandates. Additionally, 
government restrictions on individual behaviors may arouse greater 
resistance when they apply to behaviors that occur in or near the 
home or that must be enforced in or near the home. These principles, 
as well as their relevance for purposes of assessing the intrusion 
objection, are described in the next Sections. 
B. Direct Versus Indirect Regulation 
The intrusion objection hypothesizes fatal resistance to mandates 
imposed in the context of environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. As discussed in Part I, the government already channels, 
influences, and regulates many of these behaviors through a variety of 
indirect means.207 The government regularly alters individual 
environmental behaviors and reduces or increases the environmental 
impacts of individual behaviors without imposing mandates directly 
on individuals. Most notably, product mandates constrain and, in 
some cases, extinguish individual choice.208 A variety of subsidies, 
taxes, and public-information campaigns encourage environmentally 
friendly behaviors, such as the use of public transportation, or 
 
 206. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 207. As discussed in Part I.A, some laws do directly regulate environmentally significant 
individual behavior, but the primary mode of federal regulation of such behaviors is indirect.  
 208. For a discussion of product mandates, see supra note 45. 
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discourage environmentally harmful behaviors. Building-code and 
zoning requirements define the built environment and thereby 
constrain choices about where and how individuals may live, 
significantly impacting individual energy consumption.209 Moreover, 
as described in Part I, at least some direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors already occurs 
without inspiring insurmountable intrusion objections, primarily at 
the local level.210 Thus, it appears that individual environmental 
behaviors are not sacrosanct subject matter per se; insurmountable 
intrusion objections do not arise merely because the government 
adopts measures designed to change these behaviors. Indeed, the idea 
that government may appropriately act to control or influence these 
behaviors indirectly seems to be widely accepted. The intrusion 
objection appears, then, to be rooted at least in part in the means 
used by government—the imposition of mandates directly on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. 
Mandates directly proscribe individual behaviors. To illustrate 
the difference between direct mandates and policies that indirectly 
regulate individual behaviors, consider energy-conservation 
measures. As discussed in Part I, the government employs a variety of 
strategies to reduce home energy use. It requires that home 
appliances meet minimum efficiency standards,211 funds public-
information campaigns,212 maintains energy-efficiency labeling 
schemes,213 and subsidizes home weatherization.214 It does not, 
however, directly bar individuals from using appliances that do not 
meet efficiency standards, let alone proscribe even readily detected 
behavior that wastes energy, such as leaving the porch lights burning 
all night or opening windows during the winter. One could easily 
 
 209. For a description of green building and zoning codes, see supra note 46 and 
accompanying text.  
 210. For a description of laws that directly regulate environmentally significant individual 
behaviors, see supra Part I.B and accompanying text.  
 211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6291–6309 (2006). 
 212. See, e.g., LOSE YOUR EXCUSE, http://www.loseyourexcuse.gov/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2012) (featuring an energy-efficiency educational campaign organized by the U.S. 
Department of Energy).  
 213. The Energy Star labeling program was commenced by the EPA pursuant to its 
authority under section 103(g) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (2006), and is now administered 
jointly with the Department of Energy pursuant to section 324A of the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2006). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 214. 10 C.F.R. §§ 440.1–.30 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6861 (2006) (outlining the 
congressional findings and purpose of the weatherization-assistance program). 
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imagine the resistance that would likely greet proposals to ticket 
individuals for using banned appliances. What then, if anything, is the 
salient difference between effectively preventing individuals from 
using inefficient appliances through product mandates and directly 
barring them from doing so? 
The reasoning employed in the early contraception cases that 
laid the groundwork for recognizing a fundamental right to privacy—
the dissents of Justices Douglas and Harlan in Poe v. Ullman215 and 
the decision in Griswold—proves particularly useful for thinking 
about this issue.216 These cases formally announced the use of 
substantive due process to protect privacy interests217 but, at that early 
juncture, did not advance a fully formed concept of “substantive” 
privacy, or privacy that “attaches to the rightholder’s own actions” by 
“immunizing certain conduct—such as using contraceptives, marrying 
someone of a different color, or aborting a pregnancy—from state 
proscription or penalty.”218 Instead, while hinting at the substantive 
concept of privacy to come, these decisions anchored their holdings in 
“informational” privacy,219 a view of privacy found in the context of 
 
 215. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 216. The privacy interests considered in the context of the Fourth Amendment, with respect 
to the significance of the home, may prove another useful analogue, particularly as the Court 
confronts challenges to the government’s collection of personal data. See infra note 244; see also 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (limiting, on Fourth Amendment grounds, the 
monitoring of a beeper brought into a home and observing that “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of 
property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight”); 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (considering “whether the State of New York may 
record, in a centralized computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who have 
obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and 
an unlawful market” consistent with the privacy interests protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  
 217. Two Lochner-era cases, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), can be viewed as the first privacy cases, though they do not use 
that terminology. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 743 (1989) 
(identifying these cases as the “true parents of the privacy doctrine”). 
 218. Rubenfeld, supra note 217, at 740.  
 219. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 929–30 (1973). Professor Ely explains how Roe announced a new and more substantive 
right to privacy. He observes that although Roe cited to “aspects of the First, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments . . . [that] limit the ways in which, and the circumstances under which, the 
government can go about gathering information about a person he would rather it did not 
have,” Roe “is not a case about government snooping.” Id.; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 217, 
at 749 (explaining the distinction between informational privacy—which has its origins in the 
Fourth Amendment—and substantive privacy and observing that in informational privacy cases, 
“the claimant’s substantive conduct [is] irrelevant; at issue is the government’s manner of 
discovering the conduct”). 
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the Fourth Amendment, under which privacy is “employed to govern 
the conduct of other individuals who intrude in various ways upon 
one’s life” by “limit[ing] the ability of others to gain, disseminate, or 
use information about oneself.”220 Accordingly, these cases, instead of 
focusing primarily on whether or why the use of contraceptives is 
conduct that is substantively outside the scope of state regulation, 
devoted much more attention to analyzing whether and how the 
means adopted by the government independently infringed upon 
privacy and liberty.221 This approach is thus more relevant to 
considering mandates governing environmentally significant 
individual behaviors that will rarely touch on the right to privacy or 
other fundamental rights. 
The analysis in these cases supports the view that a significant 
distinction exists between the perceived liberty deprivations imposed 
by measures that indirectly influence individual behaviors and those 
imposed by measures that directly mandate changes in individual 
behaviors. Even when the results in terms of governmentally induced 
changes in behaviors are the same, direct mandates on individual 
behaviors often impose greater, or at least more salient, restrictions 
on freedom. In his dissent in Poe, Justice Douglas explained that if 
the prohibition on the use of contraceptives challenged in that case 
had been directed at the sale or manufacture of contraceptives, as 
 
 220. Rubenfeld, supra note 217, at 740. 
 221. See Ely, supra note 219, at 930 (“[T]he Court in Griswold stressed that it was 
invalidating only that portion of the Connecticut law that proscribed the use, as opposed to the 
manufacture, sale, or other distribution of contraceptives. That distinction (which would be silly 
were the right to contraception being constitutionally enshrined) makes sense if the case is 
rationalized on the ground that the section of the law whose constitutionality was in issue was 
such that its enforcement would have been virtually impossible without the most outrageous 
sort of governmental prying into the privacy of the home. And this, indeed, is the theory on 
which the Court appeared rather explicitly to settle . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (footnote 
omitted)); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (“Griswold did state 
that by ‘forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,’ 
the Connecticut statute there had ‘a maximum destructive impact’ on privacy rights. This 
intrusion into ‘the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms’ made that statute particularly 
‘repulsive.’ But subsequent decisions have made clear that the constitutional protection of 
individual autonomy in matters of childbearing is not dependent on that element.” (emphasis 
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965))). See 
generally Solove, supra note 30, at 557, 559 (characterizing the early contraception cases as 
protecting against “decisional interference,” or “governmental interference with people’s 
decisions regarding certain matters of their lives,” but adding that “[d]ecisional interference 
bears a similarity to the harm of intrusion as both involve invasions into realms where we 
believe people should be free from the incursions of others”). 
KUH IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  3:58 PM 
1164 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1111 
opposed to their use by individuals, it would not have risen to the 
same level of concern: 
If a State banned completely the sale of contraceptives in drug 
stores, the case would be quite different. It might seem to some or to 
all judges an unreasonable restriction. Yet it might not be irrational 
to conclude that a better way of dispensing those articles is through 
physicians. The same might be said of a state law banning the 
manufacture of contraceptives. Health, religious, and moral 
arguments might be marshalled pro and con. Yet it is not for judges 
to weigh the evidence. Where either the sale or the manufacture is 
put under regulation, the strictures are on business and commercial 
dealings that have had a long history with the police power of the 
States. 
 The present law, however, deals not with sale, not with 
manufacture, but with use. It provides: 
 “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for 
the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than 
fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one 
year or be both fined and imprisoned.”222 
Justice Douglas also quoted a “noted theologian” who had observed 
that “[t]he real area where the coercions of law might, and ought to, 
be applied, at least to control an evil—namely, the contraceptive 
industry—is quite overlooked.”223 
Similarly, in his dissent Justice Harlan emphasized “the 
obnoxiously intrusive means [Connecticut] ha[d] chosen to effectuate 
[its] policy.”224 He suggested that the same result might have been 
achieved by limiting distribution, but he deemed dispositive the fact 
that the statute defined use by individuals as a crime: 
[C]onclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. 
Although the Federal Government and many States have at one 
time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regulating 
the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has 
made the use of contraceptives a crime.225 
 
 222. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969)). 
 223. Id. at 521 (quoting JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 157 (1960)). 
 224. Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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Justice Harlan then explained that the government may adopt a 
variety of approaches to target the same behavior, identified other 
ways that the government might have gone about reducing the use of 
contraceptives, and argued that a direct prohibition on individual use 
presents a particularly troublesome means of influencing behavior: 
The secular state is not an examiner of consciences: it must operate 
in the realm of behavior, of overt actions, and where it does so 
operate, not only the underlying, moral purpose of its operations, 
but also the choice of means becomes relevant to any Constitutional 
judgment on what is done. The moral presupposition on which 
appellants ask us to pass judgment could form the basis of a variety 
of legal rules and administrative choices, each presenting a different 
issue for adjudication. For example, one practical expression of the 
moral view propounded here might be the rule that a marriage in 
which only contraceptive relations had taken place had never been 
consummated and could be annulled. Again, the use of 
contraceptives might be made a ground for divorce, or perhaps tax 
benefits and subsidies could be provided for large families. Other 
examples also readily suggest themselves.226 
In short, Justice Harlan found the Connecticut statute particularly 
problematic in part because it applied directly to individual behavior. 
When the Court ultimately struck down Connecticut’s birth-control 
law in Griswold, it continued to find the indirect-direct distinction 
significant, explaining, 
[The] law . . . , in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than 
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by 
means having a maximum destructive impact upon that [marital] 
relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar 
principle, so often applied by this Court, that “a governmental 
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to 
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep 
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected 
freedoms.”227 
This analysis is not meant to suggest that the sole fact that the 
birth-control laws applied to individual behavior drove the 
determination that they presented a substantive due process 
violation. The dissents in Poe and the decision in Griswold focused as 
 
 226. Id. at 547–48 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 227. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (emphasis omitted) (quoting NAACP v. 
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). 
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well on the private nature of the decision involved—thus offering an 
early articulation of a substantive privacy interest—and on method of 
enforcement: exacerbating the infringement on informational privacy, 
the prohibition “reache[d] into the intimacies of the marriage 
relationship” and required entry into the home for its enforcement.228 
But by articulating the direct-indirect distinction and by finding it 
significant, these cases provide support for an assumption underlying 
the intrusion objection: namely, that direct regulation of individual 
behaviors may be expected to give rise to or to create perceptions of 
government overstepping, even when indirect regulation operates, 
without objection, to control the same behaviors for the same end. 
Justice Douglas suggested two possibilities for why mandates on 
individual behaviors present special concerns: first, the means 
necessary to enforce mandates on individuals may independently 
impose or exacerbate liberty deprivations; and second, individuals, 
unlike “business and commercial dealings,” do not have a “long 
history with the police power of the States.”229 With respect to the first 
possibility, the means—a prohibition on use—may create problems 
by requiring enforcement through “governmental snooping” that 
includes “intolerably intrusive modes of data-gathering.”230 Such 
enforcement might even require, as discussed in Section C, 
encroachment on the most readily recognized sphere of private 
conduct: the home.231 Indeed, those aspects of the First, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendments that establish the penumbra that shelters privacy 
rights “all limit the ways in which, and the circumstances under which, 
the government can go about gathering information about a person 
he would rather it did not have.”232 
The latter point—distinguishing between businesses and 
individuals—could be understood as part of the effort to index 
 
 228. Poe, 367 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 
(“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs 
of the use of contraceptives?”). Moreover, this analysis should not be read to make a 
representation about whether, under current doctrine, a prohibition on the sale or manufacture 
of contraceptives would give rise to a substantive due process violation. Indeed, the undue-
burden approach employed in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), 
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), indicates 
that it would.  
 229. Poe, 367 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 230. Ely, supra note 219, at 930. 
 231. For a discussion of the objections to using RFID chips to monitor recycling rates and 
enforce recycling ordinances, see supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.  
 232. Ely, supra note 219, at 929.  
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substantive due process doctrine to national tradition and custom. 
Thus, if government control over a particular type of individual 
behavior is not usual or customary, it is more vulnerable under 
substantive due process review. Another related explanation is 
suggested by Professor Lawrence Lessig’s observation that “[o]ur 
constitution was written with direct regulation in mind—not because 
the framers did not understand indirect regulation, but rather because 
its significance was not great enough systematically to account.”233 
Notably, Professor Lessig goes on to suggest that in light of the 
ubiquity of indirect regulation, more attention should be given to 
weighing the constitutionality of indirect regulation.234 
Additionally, mandates on individual behaviors make more 
explicit—and hence uncomfortable—the balancing of government 
interests against personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is often 
identified as the basis for recognizing a right to privacy and, as 
Professor Richard Fallon notes, is an “interest[ ] that rights serve in 
our constitutional culture”: 
As beings who are capable of self-direction, we have an interest in 
being able to make decisions for ourselves and to act on those 
decisions that is sometimes independent of the interest in having the 
decision made that will be best for us in the sense of producing the 
greatest after-the-fact well-being.235 
With respect to the energy-efficiency product mandate discussed 
previously in this Section, personal autonomy is arguably constrained 
in much the same substantive way as it would be by a direct 
prohibition. Whether the regulation is imposed by constraining 
consumer choice through a product mandate or by a prohibition on 
the use of inefficient appliances, both measures effectively restrict 
individual freedom to use energy-inefficient appliances.236 In the 
context of the product mandate, however, the government constraint 
 
 233. Lessig, supra note 10, at 688. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. 
REV. 343, 354 (1993). 
 236. Although perhaps more palatable because the constraints on choice are hidden, 
product mandates, norm management, and other forms of indirect regulation that do not allow 
individuals the opportunity to weigh a law before obeying it arguably impose greater or more 
troubling constraints on freedom. See Posner, supra note 164, at 367 (arguing that internalized 
norms deprive individuals of the opportunity to weigh obedience to the law and thereby limit 
freedom).  
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is enforced against the manufacturer and is less apparent to the 
individual. 
The early privacy cases thus articulate and defend a distinction 
between the direct and indirect regulation of individuals that is 
relevant in evaluating the extent or nature of the liberty deprivation. 
Regardless of its explanation, the proposition that direct restraints on 
individuals can give rise to greater—or at least more uncomfortable—
restrictions on freedom than measures that constrain the same 
behaviors indirectly proves useful for thinking about mandates as a 
policy tool in the context of the environment.237 That a host of laws 
may already indirectly control environmentally significant individual 
behaviors should not be taken as evidence that a direct mandate on 
the same behaviors would be accepted. More fundamentally, the 
early privacy cases suggest that direct regulation may be perceived as 
more intrusive, and thus may occasion more frequent or more 
strident intrusion objections, than the more familiar and more 
common mode of indirect regulation. In short, the early privacy cases 
suggest that intrusion objections may be a more salient consideration 
when evaluating direct, as opposed to indirect, mandates on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors. 
C. The Significance of Home 
One of the explanations offered in the early privacy cases as to 
why direct mandates on individual behaviors present special concerns 
is that their enforcement can be intrusive, particularly when the 
regulated behaviors occur in the home.238 And the home has long 
 
 237. It perhaps confirms the obvious to state that a prohibition is more intrusive than 
discouragement or encouragement, both of which preserve some element of choice. See 
generally Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 27, at 952 (identifying tools available to the 
government to change norms and observing that “[t]he most intrusive kind of government 
action is of course straightforward coercion,” such as seatbelt laws (emphasis omitted)). The 
distinction between direct and indirect government action does, however, shed light on the less 
readily explained difference in reactions to direct mandates on behavior and indirect product 
mandates that impose the same substantive constraints on choice. 
 238. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Ely, supra 
note 219, at 930 (arguing that the distinction in Griswold between the regulation of use on the 
one hand and the regulation of the manufacture, sale, or distribution on the other was indexed 
to the required means of enforcement, which in the former case “would have been virtually 
impossible without the most outrageous sort of governmental prying into the privacy of the 
home” (emphasis omitted)). 
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been afforded special status in a variety of legal contexts.239 Similarly, 
one of the chief explanations for the intrusion objection is that 
environmentally significant individual behaviors “usually occur at 
home or in the immediately surrounding area” and that efforts to 
detect or enforce against those behaviors will necessarily intrude into 
the home, thereby triggering privacy and liberty objections.240 
Discussions of the significance of the home in substantive due 
process cases suggest both a thin and a thick account of how the home 
affects the apparent or actual intrusiveness of government conduct. 
Under a thin account, grounded in traditional, Fourth Amendment-
derived concepts of informational privacy, the physical space within 
and around the home is uniquely private and requires special 
protection from government snooping. Any regulation that requires 
for its enforcement real or potential government investigation into 
the home thus poses heightened concerns. Under a thick account, 
grounded in substantive conceptions of privacy, the fact that conduct 
occurs at least mostly in the home—“life which characteristically has 
its place in the home”241—signals that the conduct itself may warrant 
heightened privacy protection. Even absent any government entry 
into the home, government interference with the details of certain 
spheres of private or home-centered behaviors may thus give rise to 
valid claims of government overreaching. In his opinion for the Court 
in Lawrence v. Texas,242 Justice Kennedy drew a similar distinction: 
  Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the 
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres 
of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should 
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom 
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The 
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its 
more transcendent dimensions.243 
 
 239. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3105 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(listing cases and observing that “our law has long recognized that the home provides a kind of 
special sanctuary in modern life”). 
 240. Babcock, supra note 4, at 123. 
 241. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 242. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 243. Id. at 562. 
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First, as to the thin account of the significance of the home, 
substantive due process cases recognize the home as a private space 
warranting special protection from government invasion.244 The home 
is considered “the most private of places,”245 and laws that would 
require “police invasion”246 of the home for their enforcement are 
deemed particularly suspect.247 Although even private behavior that 
occurs within the home can sometimes be regulated, the cases make 
clear that “public behavior” is more amenable to regulation than 
“that which is purely consensual or solitary.”248 Even in the absence of 
actual enforcement, the prospect of possible enforcement in the home 
can be used to illustrate a law’s offensiveness. As explained by Justice 
Douglas, discussing a ban on the use of contraceptives that had not 
been enforced against individuals, “If we imagine a regime of full 
enforcement of the law . . . , we would reach the point where search 
warrants issued and officers appeared in bedrooms to find out what 
went on. . . . If [the State] can make this law, it can enforce it.”249 
 
 244. The concept of the sanctity of the home generally is not limited to or even rooted in 
substantive due process. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as Legal Concept, 46 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 255, 259–76 (2006) (reviewing treatment of the home in a variety of legal 
contexts, including in the context of the Fourth Amendment and the protection of privacy 
interests). Express constitutional provisions—most notably the Fourth Amendment—and a 
number of related doctrines similarly afford the home special protection. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 
of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (invalidating a law barring possession of obscene materials and observing 
that in the “privacy of a person’s own home—[the First Amendment] right takes on an added 
dimension”). For a discussion of how the concept of the sanctity of the home has influenced 
understandings of the scope of Fourth Amendment protections, see Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 996–1002 (1982). From a property perspective, 
Professor Margaret Radin explains that the home is property that can be understood as 
“personal,” or important for personhood, and therefore “worthier of protection” than other 
types of property. Id. at 987.  
 245. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 246. Poe, 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting MURRAY, supra note 223, at 
158). 
 247. See id. at 547–48 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This enactment involves what, by common 
understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most 
fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’ the privacy of the home in its most basic sense . . . .”). 
 248. Id. at 546 (emphasizing the sanctity of the home but identifying exceptions, including 
the government’s regulation of marriage and adultery). 
 249. Id. at 520–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 554 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (“To me the very circumstance that Connecticut has not chosen to press the 
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If this thin account indeed defines the significance of the home 
for purposes of assessing the intrusiveness of government conduct, 
then it has important implications. It suggests the possibility that 
when environmentally significant behaviors—even those that occur 
within the home—can be regulated, detected, and enforced against 
without encroaching upon the home, regulation may avoid or dampen 
intrusion objections. As noted, a number of environmentally 
significant behaviors are either external to the home or have an 
external aspect.250 A thin account of the significance of the home 
suggests that these behaviors may be amenable to regulation without 
triggering intrusion objections. 
If, however, the home has a more substantive, thicker 
significance that affords special status to conduct that occurs within 
the home, the conclusions with respect to the intrusion objection may 
be quite different. That conduct occurs primarily in a physical space 
within and around the home is sometimes offered as a justification for 
why the conduct itself falls within the scope of substantive privacy 
protections. In his dissent in Poe, Justice Harlan explained that what 
was relevant to him was not whether there had been an “intrusion 
into the home,” but whether there had been an intrusion “on the life 
which characteristically has its place in the home,” because “if the 
physical curtilage of the home is protected, it is surely as a result of 
solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within.”251 
Similarly, in Stanley v. Georgia,252 a decision that struck down a 
law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials, the Court 
reasoned that First Amendment rights are strengthened by due 
process privacy considerations when the regulated conduct occurs in 
the home. The Court referenced a “fundamental . . . right to be free, 
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental 
 
enforcement of this statute against individual users, while it nevertheless persists in asserting its 
right to do so at any time—in effect a right to hold this statute as an imminent threat to the 
privacy of the households of the State—conduces to the inference either that it does not 
consider the policy of the statute a very important one, or that it does not regard the means it 
has chosen for its effectuation as appropriate or necessary.”). A study that asked people to rank 
the intrusiveness of government searches similarly revealed that searches of the home are 
viewed as more intrusive than many other types of searches. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra 
note 21, at 738. 
 250. For example, commuter and household-waste-disposal choices are two environmentally 
significant behaviors with external aspects. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.  
 251. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 252. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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intrusions into one’s privacy”;253 posited that the protected sphere of 
individual privacy includes, most importantly, individual 
“beliefs, . . . thoughts, . . . emotions and . . . sensations”;254 observed 
that “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men’s minds”;255 and set forth 
the home as a space particularly important to the flourishing of 
private thoughts.256 
Professor Margaret Radin offers another thick conception of the 
significance of the home from a property perspective. With respect to 
“reason[s] the government should not prescribe what one may do in 
one’s home,” she recognizes the familiar need to protect liberty by 
protecting a “realm shut off from the interference of others,” but she 
also adds the idea that the home is important for personhood because 
it is where “one embodies or constitutes oneself.”257 The location of 
conduct in the home thus supports identification of the conduct itself 
as private and as outside the scope of government intervention.258 
To illustrate the significance of this thicker notion of the 
significance of the home, consider the following example. Recall the 
San Francisco ordinance described in Part I that mandates the 
composting of degradable trash and that is enforced by random 
checks of household waste for degradable material.259 Under a thin 
conception of the significance of the home, indexed to informational 
privacy and the Fourth Amendment, there should be limited room for 
 
 253. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
 254. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)). 
 255. Id. at 565. 
 256. Id. at 566. The Court went on to reference a person’s “right to satisfy . . . intellectual 
and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home” and to endorse the proposition “that a 
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or 
what films he may watch.” Id. at 565.  
 257. Radin, supra note 244, at 992. 
 258. So, for example, if autonomy is viewed as the principle underlying the right to privacy, 
then perhaps the fact that conduct occurs in the privacy of the home makes it more likely to be 
important to personhood. If antitotalitarianism is identified as the principle underlying the right 
to privacy, then perhaps the fact that conduct occurs in the privacy of the home creates a greater 
imperative to protect that conduct from government intervention to avoid “mind control.” 
 259. S.F., CAL., ENVIR. CODE § 1908 (2011) (authorizing fines of up to $100 for households 
that fail to properly sort their recyclables and compostables and authorizing inspection of trash 
receptacles).  
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individuals to complain.260 Under a thicker conception of the home, 
the same regulation may provide ground for objection and may 
require special justification, not necessarily or solely because of the 
method or means of government “snooping,” but on a more 
substantive level—discomfort about government regulation of the 
details of individuals’ food choices and preparation. 
In short, even when the government is able to enforce mandates 
directed at small, day-to-day behaviors that occur within the home via 
some information external to the home, those mandates may 
encounter privacy and liberty objections, although not of a 
constitutional nature. Whether the constitutionally recognized 
privacy interest is grounded in personal autonomy or 
antitotalitarianism, one can easily see the source of the objections. 
The imperative to conform small, mundane home-life decisions and 
behaviors—do I throw the carrot peels in the trash or a compost 
bin?—to government regulations raises the specter of weighing down 
one’s home life with worries about legal compliance. These worries 
are particularly problematic when the law is viewed as infringing 
upon personal autonomy,261 either by preventing the home from 
providing a space for unfettered thinking, reflection, and the 
development of personhood or by threatening a kind of totalitarian 
standardization and “mind control.”262 
 
 260. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (allowing warrantless searches of 
garbage). 
 261. Indeed, one of the critiques of grounding the constitutionally protected right to privacy 
in personal autonomy is the lack of a limiting principle because even the smallest decisions help 
define personhood. See Rubenfeld, supra note 217, at 754–55 (“The personhood thesis is this: 
where our identity or self-definition is at stake, there the state may not interfere. . . . Where is 
our self-definition not at stake? Virtually every action a person takes could arguably be said to 
be an element of his self-definition.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 262. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). In arguing that the right to privacy is best 
grounded in antitotalitarian rationales, Professor Jed Rubenfeld posits that, properly 
understood, the right to privacy prevents the state from dictating conduct that has significant, 
ongoing affirmative consequences for individuals—bearing a child, for example. Rubenfeld, 
supra note 217, at 784. Small day-to-day behaviors would not warrant constitutional protection 
from government interference under this standard. Id. But Professor Rubenfeld’s description of 
the antitotalitarian rationale suggests that the concerns potentially raised by government control 
over such mundane day-to-day behaviors, if not cognizable as a constitutional matter, may well 
inform public reaction:  
The danger, then, is a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed 
occupation of individuals’ lives. That is the danger of which Foucault as well as the 
right to privacy is warning us: a society standardized and normalized, in which lives 
are too substantially or too rigidly directed. That is the threat posed by state power in 
our century.  
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This thicker account of the significance of the home raises the 
possibility that direct government involvement in a certain sphere of 
day-to-day behavior understood as private will therefore be subject to 
intrusion objections even if the government is able to detect and 
enforce against these behaviors in ways that are external to the home 
and its environs. As the Court cautioned in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,263 “That many of the rights and liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant 
the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and 
personal decisions are so protected.”264 But, of course, for present 
purposes, the question is not whether an activity falls within the scope 
of constitutional protection, but rather whether its regulation is 
interpreted as government overreaching and, thus, as intrusion. 
Substantive due process cases do not merely reveal that a certain class 
of particularly important personal decisions is protected from 
government interference. They also reflect the view—also expressed 
in the context of the Fourth Amendment—that a sphere of freedom 
from government interference within the home is an important and 
recognized element of individual liberty and privacy. Individual 
behaviors within the home—even unimportant, day-to-day actions—
may fall within a sphere in which government interference is not 
welcome. Accordingly, policymakers should be cautious about 
presuming that simply identifying an external way to detect and 
enforce against environmentally significant individual behaviors will 
entirely deflect intrusion objections. 
III.  DISCERNING PRINCIPLES 
The analysis in Parts I and II suggests a few principles for 
clarifying the significance of the intrusion objection with respect to 
mandates and considering possibilities for successfully designing and 
applying mandates governing environmentally significant individual 
behaviors. Existing regulations demonstrate that indirect regulation is 
the predominant mechanism through which the government seeks to 
influence environmentally significant individual behaviors. The 
reasoning employed in the early privacy cases similarly suggests that 
 
Id. See generally Fallon, supra note 235, at 355 (identifying “‘systemic’ interests in avoiding 
abuse of government power or the collection of excessive power in the hands of government” as 
one of four primary interests underlying constitutional rights). 
 263. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 264. Id. at 727.  
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with respect to controlling individual behaviors, direct regulation of 
behaviors may be perceived as, or may in fact occasion, a greater 
liberty concern than indirect regulation of the same behaviors. Direct 
regulation of individuals may present liberty concerns because the 
means used to enforce the regulation may invade privacy. These 
concerns are likely to be particularly pronounced when the activity 
being regulated occurs primarily in the home or when government 
enforcement necessarily crosses the boundaries of the home. These 
observations confirm a core precept underlying the intrusion 
objection: namely, that even when indirect and direct regulation seek 
to change the same behaviors, direct controls on environmentally 
significant individual behaviors may, because of their means of 
enforcement, be particularly vulnerable to claims of government 
intrusion, particularly when the behaviors in question are household 
behaviors. 
This analysis also, however, suggests that the obstacle that the 
intrusion objection poses to the use of mandates on environmentally 
significant individual behaviors is both narrower and broader than 
presently understood. A review of existing regulations reveals a broad 
spectrum of grounds for public opposition to direct controls on 
environmentally significant individual behaviors: unfairness in 
allocating the burdens of environmental protection; interference with 
property rights; or straightforward balancing, which reveals that the 
measure is too inconvenient or costly to justify the desired result. This 
review provides evidence of a more general phenomenon: namely, 
that direct regulation of environmentally significant individual 
behaviors is more likely than indirect regulation to spur public 
objection because it makes the costs borne by individuals clearer to 
those individuals. Viewed in this way, intrusion—either in its 
narrower sense grounded in privacy concerns, or understood more 
loosely as government overreaching—can be understood as simply 
one cost of regulation. 
Direct regulation may often render the costs imposed on 
individuals more transparent than many methods of indirect 
regulation. For example, indirect measures to reduce car use, such as 
zoning limitations on parking, higher gas prices, or commuter lanes, 
may cause an individual to submit to the inconvenience of carpooling. 
The individual may not, however, connect this inconvenience cost to 
the government measures that are indirectly causing the individual to 
bear it. But a direct mandate requiring the individual to carpool 
would impose clear convenience costs. Similarly, a product mandate 
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requiring, for example, that paper towels contain X percent recycled 
paper may effectively extinguish consumer choice—a cost imposed on 
individuals—by rendering certain goods unavailable. Yet unless the 
mandate attracts unusual public debate and attention, as was the case 
with product mandates applicable to incandescent light bulbs, 
individuals might never be aware that their choice has been so 
limited. A direct ban on the use of paper towels containing less than 
X percent recycled paper, however, would make the limitation on 
individual choice, and hence the cost imposed on individuals, clear. 
And indirect regulation aimed at upstream producers and 
manufacturers—such as effluent limits applied to factories or 
restrictions on pesticides used to grow cotton—in an attempt to 
reduce the environmental impacts occasioned when an individual 
purchases a shirt, for example, likely raises the cost to the individual, 
but the individual may well be unaware of how environmental 
regulation is driving that additional cost. 
Direct regulation thus invites greater public objection by not, in 
the manner of some common methods of indirect regulation, 
obscuring the tradeoffs and costs imposed on individuals. Notably, 
when the costs imposed on individuals are clear, even indirect 
regulation of individuals can encounter insurmountable political 
resistance, as sometimes occurs with taxes or as occurred with the 
well-publicized product mandates dictating changes in the 
incandescent light bulb. Thus, the intrusion objection might be 
viewed more broadly as a recognition that direct regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors may be expected to 
spur more pronounced public opposition simply because it invites the 
public to evaluate the propriety of government action by balancing 
the benefits of that action against the unobscured costs to individuals, 
including the intrusion cost of the action.265 
The intrusion objection also appears to present a narrower, or 
less complete, obstacle to the use of mandates than presently 
understood. A survey of existing regulations suggests that the 
vulnerability of direct mandates to public opposition on the intrusion 
ground should not be viewed as a fatal Achilles’ heel of mandates as a 
policy tool. A review of existing regulation reveals that direct 
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors is not 
an area per se off-limits to government. Direct regulation of 
 
 265. It is fair to emphasize the particular salience of intrusion objections in contexts in which 
the behavior regulated occurs within, or enforcement requires access to, the home. 
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environmentally significant individual behaviors, although less 
common than indirect regulation, occurs daily in a variety of forms in 
different communities, from recycling laws to burn limitations to 
vehicle inspections. Moreover, my analysis suggests strategies for 
designing and applying mandates to minimize or overcome public 
objections. Mandates are more likely to succeed when they do not 
impose disproportionate burdens on a select few, when they do not 
unduly transgress the home, when they are designed to minimize 
inconvenience and other costs to the public, and when they are 
effectively “sold” to the public through communication and 
demonstration of the measure’s benefits.266 Finally, the American 
experience with mandates governing environmentally significant 
individual behaviors suggests that objections may soften over time. 
Ideas and programs initially greeted with deep skepticism, such as the 
vehicle I/M program, may ultimately become routine. 
My analysis also suggests a few points about the narrower, 
privacy-based intrusion objection. First, all modes of regulation—
both direct and indirect—are susceptible to this privacy-based 
intrusion objection. Even smart meters, which indirectly regulate 
individuals by collecting information to educate them about their 
energy use, to encourage voluntary conservation, and to support peak 
pricing, can trigger privacy concerns. Second, although the intrusion 
objection is deemed particularly important with respect to direct 
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors 
because of the assumption that those behaviors must be detected 
using methods likely to trigger intrusion objections—such as 
monitoring within the home—experience to date suggests that this 
problem is not as pervasive as perhaps assumed. Many behaviors are 
regulated without triggering insurmountable intrusion objections, and 
even some approaches that do occasion concerns about informational 
privacy, such as RFID tracking of garbage, are ultimately accepted in 
some communities.267 In other words, some environmentally 
significant behaviors can be directly regulated without using the 
privacy-invading means hypothesized in the literature and in the early 
privacy cases. 
 
 266. For an argument that local development and enforcement of mandates may facilitate 
their implementation, see Kuh, supra note 12, at 165–96. 
 267. Ultimately, the question will revert to one of balancing: Do the measure’s benefits 
outweigh its costs—including any privacy costs imposed to detect behavior and enforce the 
measure? This question is salient even in the context of the Fourth Amendment, an area in 
which the permissibility of intrusion is also ascertained by balancing. 
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Avoiding public opposition to the environmental regulation of 
individuals, whether direct or indirect, may be particularly difficult 
for a variety of reasons. The benefits of regulation may, for example, 
accrue to future generations or may not be immediate, tangible, or 
obvious.268 Some strategies that could increase the chances that a 
measure will pass public balancing might include (1) maximizing the 
benefits achieved by a measure and effectively educating the public 
about those benefits, (2) obscuring the costs imposed on the public, or 
(3) minimizing the costs imposed on the public. Intrusion—whether 
viewed in terms of invading privacy or in terms of government 
overreaching more generally—is simply a cost that regulation imposes 
on individuals. Direct mandates on environmentally significant 
behaviors may sometimes impose intrusion costs that indirect 
methods of regulation do not and may also render more transparent 
the costs—intrusion and others—being imposed on individuals. But 
indirect methods of regulating individuals can also impose intrusion 
costs and visible costs, and such methods are likewise sometimes 
politically unacceptable. And any measure, whether its regulation of 
environmentally significant individual behaviors is direct or indirect, 
may be vulnerable to opposition if its costs cannot be justified by its 
benefits. 
The intrusion objection is thus perhaps better viewed simply as a 
commonsense, shorthand statement of this accounting. Direct 
mandates on environmentally significant individual behaviors may be 
a less promising policy tool because they can, in some cases, impose 
an intrusion cost that indirect regulation of the same behaviors might 
not impose, or because they might make the myriad costs of 
regulation more visible to individuals in ways that make it harder for 
those measures to muster support. To the extent that direct mandates 
are costlier to administer and enforce, that reality would also affect 
this accounting. Importantly, restated in this way, the intrusion 
objection emerges as a rough guide for assessing when mandates can 
successfully be applied to environmentally significant individual 
behaviors, as opposed to an explanation for why mandates are not 
generally suitable for that purpose. 
 
 268. See Biber, supra note 108, at 1317–28 (explaining the difficulty of maintaining political 
support for regulation when there is a delay between human activity and the environmental 
harms imposed by that activity because individuals tend to have high discount rates and 
experience the endowment effect, especially when such regulation constrains longstanding 
activities).  
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So what would a mandate on such behaviors that respects these 
principles and that has a greater potential to survive public balancing 
look like? Imagine a local ordinance prohibiting energy waste. The 
ordinance might include a catchall prohibition on energy waste and 
could provide a list of examples of prohibited conduct, all externally 
detectible. The list might include excessive idling, driving with tires 
that are not property inflated, failing to change a vehicle’s air filter at 
recommended intervals, leaving porch lights burning during daytime 
hours, using incandescent bulbs for outdoor lighting, failing to sort 
recyclables, and other energy-wasting behaviors that offer the 
possibility for detection outside the home.269 The ordinance might also 
include a disclaimer that it does not authorize in-home inspections. 
Individuals cited for a violation of the ordinance would be ticketed 
and would have the option of either paying a fine, submitting a 
receipt showing the purchase of an approved energy-saving device of 
equivalent value, or submitting a signed certification that the 
individual had implemented an approved energy-saving measure at 
home.270 The benefits of the ordinance—the projected energy savings 
from changes in these types of behaviors, as well as the most locally 
salient rationale in favor of conserving energy, whether it be thrift, 
national security, or avoidance of environmental harms—should be 
clearly stated upon its enactment, reiterated in the literature 
accompanying tickets, and incorporated into any associated public-
information campaign.271 
 
 269. Many of these examples are taken from Michael Vandenbergh’s article, Individual 
Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, supra note 12, which identifies ways individuals and 
households can reduce energy consumption, id. at 1718–19.  
 270. Some work suggests that fines may actually increase undesirable behavior, perhaps by 
communicating that individuals may engage in a behavior as long as they pay a “price,” 
displacing altruistic or intrinsic motivations. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation 
Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 602–03 (2001) (reviewing empirical data 
demonstrating the crowding theory, including data showing that the initiation of fines for late 
pickups at a daycare center increased instances of lateness); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A 
Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (2000). For present purposes, I leave open the 
possibility that the structure of fines could escalate to better approximate a penalty, as opposed 
to a price, or that a mandate coupled with a public-education campaign could mitigate this 
problem if necessary. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 13, at 755 (“Studies suggest a synergistic 
effect when incentives or fines are paired with a public education campaign to reinforce the 
moral case for engaging in a behavior.” (citing LURA CONSULTING, THE CARROT, THE STICK, 
AND THE COMBO: A RECIPE FOR REDUCING VEHICLE IDLING IN CANADIAN COMMUNITIES 6–
7 (2005))).  
 271. Communication about the ordinance should take guidance from social-science 
literature, which provides insights about how best to communicate information to support 
behavioral change. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 13, at 741–66 (using behavioral research 
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Structuring the ordinance in this manner would avoid some of 
the attributes of direct mandates that are likely to engender 
significant public opposition. The imagined ordinance is a local 
ordinance. As I have argued elsewhere, local information may prove 
helpful in designing and enforcing mandates that will avoid undue 
objection.272 Thus, the examples of prohibited conduct should be 
decided on a community-by-community basis, and communities 
should adopt community-appropriate exemptions. Although the 
ordinance would unquestionably prohibit energy-wasting conduct 
that occurs in the home, such as the use of standby power, the express 
prohibition on home entry for enforcement, combined with the fact 
that specific examples of prohibited conduct are limited to those that 
are externally visible, may help to defuse intrusion objections. Yet the 
ordinance has the potential to reach in-home conduct by allowing 
individuals to satisfy ticket penalties by modifying their in-home 
behaviors. Clear communication of the benefits of the ordinance, in 
addition to local tailoring to avoid forcing changes that might prove 
highly inconvenient or costly in a given community, could help blunt 
balancing opposition. Explanations of the benefits of the ordinance 
should also hew to local attitudes and values. And the evenhanded 
and wide application of the ordinance should avoid fairness 
objections. 
This account should not be taken to suggest that this type of 
mandate would prove acceptable in all communities. But it does seem 
likely to avoid some common objections to direct mandates and 
perhaps, therefore, to expand the number of communities in which it 
could prove successful. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this Article is modest. The intrusion objection, 
frequently held up as a key reason that mandates cannot be relied 
upon to change environmentally significant individual behaviors, does 
not in fact pose an insurmountable obstacle. Indeed, mandates on 
 
to provide a framework that accounts for both rational and extrarational responses when 
attempting to change behavior). 
 272. See Kuh, supra note 12, at 165–96. Professor Jason Czarnezki similarly emphasizes the 
importance of local tailoring for influencing individual behaviors and recommends that 
policymakers “[e]valuate what level of government or private action, if any, is best suited to 
change specific individual behaviors, recognizing that often much more can be done at the local 
and community level.” CZARNEZKI, supra note 3, at 3.  
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environmentally significant behaviors may be more feasible than the 
present literature suggests. 
The intrusion objection does, however, capture two challenges to 
the use of mandates. First, to the extent that the enforcement of 
direct mandates more frequently requires the collection of 
information about individuals, mandates may more frequently 
occasion informational-privacy objections than may indirect 
regulation. As noted, however, it appears that many opportunities 
exist to impose mandates without collecting this type of information, 
and this objection might thus be overcome. Second, direct regulation, 
unlike some forms of indirect regulation, will often make clear to 
individuals the costs—including inconvenience, economic costs, and 
limitations on choice—that the government is requiring them to incur 
in the name of environmental protection. Again, the obstacle posed 
by this transparency of costs is not insurmountable. Moreover, from a 
normative perspective, the correct response to the problem would 
hardly seem to be that of shunting controls on individuals into forms 
of indirect regulation that obscure the costs to individuals precisely to 
avoid democratic debate. Instead, a combination of strategies—local 
tailoring, use of social-science research, communication of the 
benefits and rationales for environmental-protection laws, and 
recognition that time can soften public objection—can be employed 
to speak directly to public questions about balancing. 
